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Defending electrical devices against a variety of attacks is a daunting
task. A lot of researchers have endeavored to address this issue by proposing
security solutions that can attain high level of security while minimizing
performance overhead introduced to the system. Among them, hardware-
based security solutions have been noted for high performance compared to
their software-based counterparts. However, we have witnessed that these
mechanisms have rarely been accepted to the market. This phenomenon may
be attributed to the fact that most solutions incur non-negligible modifica-
tions to the host architecture internals and thus would substantially increase
the design time and manufacturing cost. In order to answer this problem, a
hardware-based external monitoring has recently been proposed. The crux of
this solution is that, being located outside the host core and connected to the
host via a standard bus interface, the external monitor can efficiently conduct
time-consuming monitoring tasks on behalf of the host while requiring no
alteration to the host internals. However, these approaches either suffer from
the incapability of handling various security problems or experience unsubtle
performance overhead because, being externally placed and having no dedi-
cated communication channels, the hardware monitor has a limited access
to the information produced by the host core, and consequently, the system
may be forced to use memory regions or other shared hardware resources
to explicitly transfer the information from the host to the monitor hardware.
In this thesis, we propose a security solution that can carry out more com-
i
plicated security tasks with low performance overhead while keeping the
host internal architecture intact. This can be archived by using an existing
standard debug interface, readily available in numerous modern processors,
to connect our security monitor to the host processor. In order to show the
validity of our approach and explore the implication of using the debug inter-
face for security monitoring, we present three security monitoring systems
each of which addresses one of three well-known security issues: defending
against kernel rootkits, tracking information-flow, and defense of code-reuse
attacks. The experiment results show that, when implemented on a FPGA
prototyping board, our monitoring solutions successfully detect the attack
samples (i.e., data leakage attacks and CRAs). More importantly, our systems
can attain significantly low performance overhead compared to previously
proposed security monitoring solutions. The experiments also reveal that the
area overhead of the hardware is acceptably small when compared to the
normal sizes of today’s mobile processors.
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As technology rapidly evolves, we are nowadays surrounded by a myriad
electrical devices, including desktops, laptops, tablets, mobile phones, and
smart watches. With these devices, we can do various things; they include
seemingly trivial tasks such as sending emails and accessing social network
sites to considerably more serious business like online banking and measuring
medical information. As the amount of private information managed in these
devices drastically increases, they are becoming more appealing targets of
attackers.
In order to protect these devices (which we call the system from now
on) against various attacks, a number of security solutions have been pro-
posed in literature [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Techniques they employ
in their solutions can roughly be categorized as follows: (1) encryption (2)
obfuscation (3) isolation (4) system monitoring. Encryption is a process of
converting one data form into another, called ciphertext, basically making
the original data impossible to be read or be understood by unauthorized
users. Unlike encryption techniques that use keys to convert the whole data,
obfuscation deliberately changes the layout of the structure of original data or
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inserts redundant logics to original source code in a way that malicious users
cannot easily understand the original meaning of the code/data. Isolation
is, as the name implies, the way of protecting information by placing it in
a reserved, isolated space that cannot be accessed without proper authority.
Lastly, system monitoring is an act of watching a specific set of system
behaviors and checking whether the behaviors deviate from the ones of the
legitimate system.
More specifically, the system monitoring technique mainly checks the
execution behaviors of a program running on the host system to find any
symptom of attacks. For monitoring, users or system administrators firstly
define a set of rules (or invariants) that mostly signify the legitimate behaviors
of target applications during normal code execution. At runtime, a security
monitor deployed on the system checks whether there is any violation of these
rules. If there is any detection of such an event, then the system administrators
are notified of a possible attack.
Among many techniques, this system monitoring techniques have been
adopted in many security solutions addressing a variety of attacks from
monitoring the integrity of OS kernels [10, 12, 13, 14, 8, 9, 11] to monitor-
ing application behaviors to detect any suspicious activities, for instance,
by performing dynamic information flow tracking or control flow integrity
checking [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. These security monitoring schemes can
be implemented in various forms. Two mainstream research directions are
software-based [14, 8, 9, 22, 23, 15, 16, 17] and hardware-based approaches
[7, 13, 10, 12, 11, 18, 19].
In general, the former approaches have popularity in the security com-
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munity as they do not necessitate underlying hardware modification, thus
allowing the easy deployment of such solutions to commodity hardware
platforms. Moreover, they can easily adapt to new types of attacks as their
core algorithms exist in the form of software, which can be readily updated
in the field. Not surprisingly, however, they have a drawback in that they
may impose substantial computational loads upon the host machine, which
is not desirable for these solutions to be deployed in practice. For instance,
in the case of DIFT, the flow of critical data needs to be monitored at ev-
ery instruction that possibly moves the data from a secure storage to some
other places. Even after aggressive optimizations [16, 17], the overhead
still remains one or two orders of magnitude higher than that of hardware
approaches [18, 19] in which extra hardware for monitoring operations is
designed and integrated into an existing processor for acceleration. The main
source of such a performance loss is that these software-based monitors are
another software layer that competes with other software in the system for
computing resources.
The hardware-based approaches, on the contrary, utilize an isolated
hardware module which is physically independent of the monitored host
system, thus unaffecting the operation of the tasks running on the host.
Several works introduced in [13, 24, 25, 10, 12, 11, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 18, 19].
These hardware solutions tend to exhibit high performance by accelerating
the monitoring process with the assistance of customized hardware logics for
the task.
Despite their dramatic performance enhancement, they have a few draw-
backs. The first one is that they may require the redesign of the existing
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processor architecture if one wants to maximize the overall performance
while attaining high level of security. For instance, authors in [27, 28, 29]
present solutions in which their hardware logics are tightly coupled with the
host CPU for close monitoring of every control transfer during code execution.
Such a close coupling requires major modifications to processor internal com-
ponents such as pipeline datapaths or the structure of registers[31, 27, 28, 29],
which would stymie the direct deployment of these solutions into commercial
platforms.
The second drawback is that, if one chooses to avoid the aforementioned
problem and places the monitor at the outside the host procesor as proposed
in [12, 10, 11, 13, 20, 21], they may either have their system experiencing
non-negligible performance overhead or have their monitor less useful than it
should be. Undoubtedly, in their approaches, the host processor can concen-
trate on the execution of its own code while the time-consuming monitoring
task is offloaded to the specialized hardware module outside the processor;
in the literature, they empirically demonstrated that their monitoring scheme
can be carried out in a great speed by external hardware, relieving significant
burden for the extra computation from the host.
Nevertheless, there still remains an inefficiency. It originates from the
limited ability of an external module to watch every internal state change
dynamically made by the code running on the host. For precise security
monitoring, the external monitor should be able to receive from the host
various runtime information such as branch targets, memory addresses and
register moves. Without such information, the effectiveness of such hardware
monitors are subtatially reduced, and are allowed to perform only simple
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tasks such as monitoring memeoy access patterns as proposed in [13, 10, 11].
To conduct more sophisticated monitoring tasks, researchers in [21, 20]
sugest the use of share memory regions to explicitly deliver the essential
information from the host to the monitor. Even though their approaches
exhibit a substantial performance improvement compared to software-based
approches, there still remains non-negligible performance overhead mainly
due to the tremendous amount of traffic for communication. As reported
in [21, 20], the overehad is up to 30% of the total execution time even after
all their optimizations through hardware communication buffers and special
instructions.
In this thesis, we propose a new security monitoring solution that can
resolve the problems of the previous works; the monitoring system imple-
mented under the guidance of our solution can carry out more complicated
security tasks with negligible performance overhead while keeping the host
internal architecture intact. Complex as it sounds, but our monitoring so-
lution merely suggests that the monitoring engine be placed externally to
the host processor, similar to those introduced in [21, 20, 12, 10, 13], and
that the engines be connected to the host processor via an existing standard
interface, called the core debug interface (CDI), which is readily available
for debugging purposes in various modern processors including ARM Cortex
series and Intel x86 architectures [32, 33, 34].
Once they are plugged into CDI, our monitor engines can access bounti-
ful information transmitted in the form of signals from CDI. The signals from
CDI can largely be categorized into two groups. The first group of signals
convey information relavant to the control-flow transfer of code executed
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on the host system. The second group of signals present memory access
behaviors such as target addresses of a memory access with its corresponding
(written/read) value for the access. In our solution, these groups of signals,
which we hereafter call the control-flow information and data-flow infor-
mation respectively, are the key element that enable us to build a variety of
security monitoring mechanisms on external hardware monitors.
Simple as it may sound, but using these signals for building up a security
system can involve several complications majorly because the initial set of
signals from CDI cannot simply be fed into the security monitor as they
are in their present form. Some signals originally generated for debugging
may need to be translated into another form that is required for security
monitoring. Therefore, in order to show the implication of using CDI for
security monitoring, this thesis presents in its main chapters three well-known
security problems, each of which monitoring solution requires different
groups of signals to address the corresponding problem. In Chapter 3, attacks
that target the integrity of an OS kernel is presented. The chapter shows,
under the vigilance of our proposed monitor and thanks to the data-flow
information transferred via CDI, no attack launched on the system can
compromise the kernel. Chapter 5 describes a well-known attack technique
that attackers tweak the control flow of a legitimate code into performing
malicious operations. The second monitorng system presented in this chapter
uses the control-flow information coming from CDI to detect any suspicious
control-flow change. Chapter 4 presents a monitoring system that uses both
control-flow and data-flow information to monitor the trace of secret data.
At runtime, every data derived from the secret data is tainted and tracked
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throughout the operation, and if any tainted data is involed in potentially
illegal activities, our monitoring system raises an alarm.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces and sumarizes
the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a brief explanation of CDI and presents past
work in the area of software-based and hardware-based monitoring solutions.
Chapter 3 describes a monitoring solution that makes use of data-flow infor-
mation to detect attacks targetting OS kernels. In Chapter 5, a monitoring
solution that uses the control-flow information is explained. Chapter 4 shows
the third monitoring solution that, to detect the misuse of critical data, makes
use of both control-flow and data-flow information. And finally, Chapter 6
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Core Debug Interface
As the complexity of software running on a processor drastically in-
creases, recent commodity processor vendors tend to include rich debug
features in thier hardware. The On-chip debug (OCD) unit [35, 34] is such a
hardware feature that supports efficient real-time debugging/tracing without
affecting the performance of the target processor. Provided by OCD, a rich set
of information allows developers (or users), on their debugging environment
(usually on desktop machines), to follow the path that the target CPU takes
as a result of code execution and monitor values in various registers and
memories. Representative examples of OCD are the ARM CoresSight mod-
ules [32] supported in ARM Cortex series processors such as the embedded
trace macrocell (ETM) and the program trace macrocell (PTM).
CDI is an interface placed on the CPU side, whose main role is to
provide OCD with the CPU’s internal status information that is essential
for debug/trace. In general, the OCD modules provide various signals to
8
Signal Description
ETMICTL [20:0] ETM instruction control bus
ETMIA [31:1] ETM instruction address
ETMDCTL [10:0] ETM data control bus
ETMDA [31:0] ETM data address
ETMDD [63:0] ETM data write data value
ETMCID [31:0] Current processor Context ID
table 1: Description of CDI signals for ETM
developers such as instruction address, current context ID (or process ID),
and data address/value of memory access instructions, which are useful
information to keep track of the behavior of a monitored program. Thus, CDI
for the OCD modules also provide such information through the dedicated
signal lines [32]. As an example, in Table 1, the signals to ETM provided by
ARM processors through CDI is described. Although the types of information
supported by CDI can vary from one processor architecture to another, the
signals presented in Table 1 are generally provided in most CDIs.
2.2 Related Work
As introduced in Chapter 1, there have been much research conducted
to defend computer systems from various security attacks. In this section,
we present a number of security solutions which mainly rely their detection
techniques on monitoring the behaviors or patterns exhibited on the host
system as a result of target program code execution. Starting from the de-
scription of the software-based monitoring solutions, we revisit past work
on hardware-based monitoring solutions, and finally we address some work
9
relavant to the use of debug interfaces to other purposes than their original
usages.
2.2.1 Software-based Monitoring solutions
To defend the computer systems from various security attacks, there
have been proposed a number of monitoring techniques, such as DIFT [22],
memory bound checking and control flow integrity checking [15]. The most
popular way to realize security monitoring schemes is to implement them
in software. Most software monitoring approaches [22, 16, 36, 17, 37, 15]
have relied upon either source-code instrumentation or dynamic binary
translation (DBT) [38] for the defense against diverse attacks at execution
time. However, the main drawback of them is that they experience excessively
high performance overhead. For example, in [22] that proposes a software-
based DIFT implementation, the overhead reaches up to about 40 times the
original code execution time in the worst case. The performance overhead
of DROP [23], which proposes a ROP detection scheme, ranges from 1.9X
to 21X. MoCFI [39], which introduces a CFI checking technique on ARM-
based mobile devices, shows the performance loss about 5X. Considering
that these techniques are usually employed for runtime monitoring, the
performance degradation is not acceptable to be deployed in real machines.
2.2.2 Hardware-based Monitoring with Invasive Modification
To address the shortcoming of software-based monitoring, some early
hardware approaches [18, 19, 27, 28, 40, 20] tried to improve performance
by inserting into the host processor core dedicated hardware modules that
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accelerate monitoring computations. The main advantage of these approaches
is that they do not need to instrument the host code and thus they could bring
the overhead down to under 5%. However, they have a disadvantage in that
invasive modifications to the processor internal (e.g., registers and pipeline
data paths) are required. For instance in [18], inside the core, they installed
hardware tagging units to conduct DIFT, called the flow tracker and tag
checker, and widened the widths of registers, internal datapaths and caches,
to accommodate tag bits, all of which call for major changes of the proces-
sor internal. In fact, modern microprocessor development may take several
years and hundreds of engineers from an initial design to production [31].
Therefore, the substantial costs of development to integrate the customized
logic would hamper processor vendors to adopt them, unless the necessity is
clearly established.
2.2.3 Hardware-based Monitoring with Minimal Modification
In an attempt to minimize the internal architecture changes, the re-
searchers in [20, 21] suggested security monitoring solutions in the existing
multi-core environment where one general-purpose core is devoted solely to
run a helper thread that performs tag propagation for the main code running
concurrently on a different core. In [31, 41], they proposed an external device
that performs monitoring outside the host. By dedicating the monitoring task
to a separate core or an external hardware, these approaches can manage
to enhance the performance drastically. However, as discussed earlier, the
fundamental problem of these approaches is that a vast amount of informa-
tion must be continuously delivered to the external hardware for accurate
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monitoring operations [41]. To cope with this communication issue, they
modified either the x86 architecture to supplement special hardware queues
and new instructions [20, 21], or the CPU pipeline datapath to provide a
customized channel between the host and the external device [31]. Our work
is somewhat similar to the work in [31] since both propose the external
hardware optimized for DIFT. But ours is different from theirs in that we
exploit the standard interface CDI for communication. The security engines
proposed in our work have been specially designed to perform the monitoring
tasks by interpreting the signals for debugging from CDI.
2.2.4 Hardware-based Kernel Integrity Monitors
The idea of using a separate hardware module to secure the kernel was
first proposed by Hollingworth et al [42]. In the work, they used a symmetric
multi-processor to secure the kernel. Later, Zhang et al. [43] suggested
deploying an intrusion detection system on a coprocessor to monitor the
host. Petroni et al. designed and implemented Copilot [13], a snapshot-based
kernel integrity monitor based on a coprocessor PCI card. Originally, Copilot
focused on monitoring only immutable kernel regions, where the residing
code or data should not be changed during runtime, but additional effort
had been made in [25] to monitor kernel dynamic regions, where the data
can be modified as a result of legitimate kernel operations, as well. Baliga
et al. presented a PCI card-based two-phase rootkit detection technique in
which the first phase automatically extracts the invariants of kernel data
structures and the second phase enforces the invariants at run-time [24]. Even
though these monitors employed external hardware module to secure the
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kerel, they employed snapshot-based approach, which periodically takes
snapshot of memory contents to detect suspicious activities. Therefore, they
cannot constantly monitor the memory contents since doing so would impose
performance overhead on the system. Moreover, their periodic monitoring
opens up a new vulnerability, which can be exploited by transient attacks as
reported in [10].
Recently, researchers who are aware of the problem of transient attacks
proposed snoop-based external monitors. Vigilare [10] was the first work that
leverages an external hardware monitor to constantly snoop the system bus
to protect immutable kernel regions. In [11], they also proposed snooping
techniques. They especially has shown the feasibility of the approach by
showing that only small portion of all memory access are related to operating
system kernel and the portion of write in the access is again small. KI-
Mon [12] extended the Vigilare to monitor both immutable and mutable
kernel regions. These monitors have the capacity of defending a system with
negligible performance overhead, but the scope of attacks they can address
is somewhat limited in that they can monitor only memory access patterns
placed on the standard bus interface.
2.2.5 Utilizing debug interface
The idea of using debug interface for other purpose rather than debug-
ging has been proposed in other works, especially in the field of fault-tolerent
computing [44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50]. In [44, 45, 46, 47], they proposed
methods of injecting faults to the host system by accessing internal resources
such as registers and memory via existing OCD. In doing so, they tried to
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facilitate fault tolerance evaluation. Their works are different from ours be-
cause they use OCD to intrusively modify the internal state of the host CPU
to inject faults while ours are directly connected to CDI to monitor the trace
of memory access events so as to detect malicious attempt. In [48, 49, 50],
they presented error detection approaches utiilizing available debugging in-
terface, CDI or trace buffer in OCD, to retrieve control flow information as
well as load/store information. The overall concept of exploiting information
flowing out of CDI is same to the of our monitoring system, but the main
objective is different in that theirs is to detect faults while ours is to defend
the host system against various security attacks.
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Chapter 3
Monitoring the Integrity of OS Kernels
with Data-Flow Information
3.1 Introduction
As electronic devices such as PCs and smartphones become essential
parts of our everyday life, the potential privacy and security risks due to
numerous malwares on the devices are rapidly growing. As a means to
protect such devices from these attacks, current OSes support a variety of
anti-malware solutions. These solutions usually depend on the services from
the underlying OS kernel, implying that they would only work as designed
when the integrity of the kernel is ensured. However, the kernel integrity
has been seriously threatened since the advent of kernel level rootkits that
manipulate the kernel so as to achieve certain goals (i.e., concealing their
existence or providing backdoor accesses). Because the kernel operates at
the highest privilege level in the system, the compromised kernel may nullify
the effectiveness of any anti-malware measures that have their root of trust
on the kernel.
The threat of rootkits have urged researchers to conduct much study to
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seek a more secure computing base that can safely monitor the system and
ensure the kernel integrity even in the presence of rootkits. Two mainstream
of the research directions are hypervisor-based [14, 8, 9] and hardware-
based approaches [7, 13, 10, 12, 11]. In general, the former approaches have
popularity in the security community as they do not necessitate underlying
hardware modification while providing a higher privileged, thus safer, soft-
ware layer for monitoring than the kernel does. However, the latest attacks
[51] and reported vulnerabilities [52] pointed toward the probability that the
code and data of hypervisors can also be compromised at runtime. Although
the known vulnerabilities have been fixed shortly, the growing complexity of
hypervisors implicates that there would be more vulnerabilities revealed in
the near future.
The hardware-based approaches utilize an isolated hardware module
physically independent of the monitored host system [13, 10, 12, 11]. In
particular, prominent monitoring schemes are recently proposed in [10, 12,
11]. At the center of these approaches, there is a hardware monitor, which
we hereafter call the snoop-based monitor, whose role is to detect malicious
attempts to alter the kernel by snooping every data traffic between the host
CPU and main memory. Being located at the outside of the host as a dedicated
hardware unit, the monitor is not only immune to rootkits attacks on the host,
but also able to constantly observe the memory access behaviors of rootkits
revealed on the system bus without affecting the host performance.
Although snoop-based monitors have been working well in their environ-
ments and assumptions, we have recently discovered a potential vulnerability
which future attackers might exploit. It comes from the fact that most com-
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puter systems employ write-back caches. Being located in between the host
CPU and main memory, caches hold copies of data or instructions recently
accessed by CPU, thereby boosting the overall system performance to a large
extent. However, for the perspective of snoop-based monitors, the existence
of caches can be disadvantageous because they shall reduce the number of
events that the monitors can watch. For example, if a rootkit tries to com-
promise the kernel by modifying sensitive data, and the very data hits in the
cache, then the write traffic would not appear on the system bus, rendering
the monitor oblivious of the write event.
Even though some previous works discussed the possibility that this
problem may seriously undermine the effectiveness of their approaches
[10, 12, 11], none of them has properly addressed this cache-induced hiding
(CIH) effect problem. In [12], they tried to avert the problem by restricting
the usage of their monitors to the systems with write-through caches. In [11],
they merely mentioned a simple scheme of using periodic cache flush. Unfor-
tunately, they did not provide any empirical data about how much loss their
scheme may suffer on performance, detection rate or power consumption.
However, as we will see later, our study evinces that frequent cache flush
might increase the host performance overhead to a large extent.
In this chapter, we present a hardware-assisted low-overhead solution
which thwarts the CIH effect by enabling the external monitors to directly
access the cache resident information (CRI) which includes all the internal
data residing within the cache without being exposed on the system bus. To
implement this solution, we utilized the existing hardware logic, CDI, which
can be found in several processors available today such as ARM Cortex series
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and Xilinx MicroBlaze[35, 34]. If CDI is plugged into a security monitor,
the bountiful information provided by CDI, which contains memory access
events issued by CPU, would certainly help monitor perform its desired task
without the CIH effect.
This task, however, involves several complications in implementation
majorly because the initial set of signals from CDI cannot be simply fed into
the security monitor as they are in their present form. Some signals originally
generated for debugging must be translated into another form that is required
for security monitoring. Therefore, we have developed an extra hardware
unit, called the Extrax, that being located between CDI and security monitors,
carefully examine and properly refine or transform each individual signal
from the interface before delivering it to the monitor.
To validate our design and further explore the implication of this addi-
tional circuits to the overall system, we have implemented a full snoop-based
monitoring system in which the host system has been augmented with Extrax.
With the system prototyped on a FPGA platform, we evaluated and compared
the performance, power and area of our full system against the baseline
system in which Extrax is not deployed. Experiment results exhibit that our
monitor, with modest area and power overhead but with the host performance
being almost unaffected, successfully detects rootkit attacks regardless of the
type of caches while the baseline monitor often fails.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first present a mo-
tivational example in Section 3.2. Then in Section 3.3, the assumption and
threat model are presented. In Section 3.4, the baseline system is presented
to show the overall operation of hardware-based monitoring. Section 3.5
18
describes the details of the proposed security extension, Extrax. After Section
3.6 shows our experimental results, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.8.
3.2 Motivational Example
We define cache resident attacks as malicious attacks that, intentionally
or unintentionally take advantage of the CIH effect; the existence of write-
back caches can unintentionally blindfold snoop-based monitors by impeding
memory write events from appearing on the system bus, or attackers can
intentionally hide the evidence of attacks by overwriting the malicious data
residing in caches with benign one, thereby prohibiting the monitors to
detect the symptom of attacks. To better explain, we chose the loadable
kernel module (LKM) hiding technique as a representative cache resident
attack example since many rootkits in the wild employ the technique to
hide themselves. LKMs are initially designed to support extension of the
kernel code at runtime without recompiling the entire kernel. However, they
are often used by attackers to conceal malicious processes, files or even
themselves from detection mechanisms. Adversaries achieve their goal of
hiding LKMs by directly modifying the kernel data structures that maintain
the list of loaded LKMs.
Figure 1 shows how the LKM hiding technique is affected by write-back
caches. In (a), there are several LKMs, each of which is represented by the
struct module. The kernel handles the LKMs by maintaining the modules
list, which is a linked list of struct module. Upon the module load request,
































Figure 1: Cache resident LKM hiding attack
adds the corresponding struct module to the list, which is the head of the
modules list. In a system with write-back cache, the list will be cached after
this step, and subsequent accesses to the data structure will also hit in the
cache. Thus, even if the malicious LKM removes itself from the modules
list by directly manipulating the pointers of the modules list as depicted in
(c), this event might not be placed on the system bus. Consequently, recently
proposed snoop-based monitors might no longer guarantee the integrity of
the kernel since they detect attacks by snooping the system bus. Hence, a
novel way to nullify CIH effect should be devised.
3.3 Assumptions and Threat Models
We use the assumption taken by previous snoop-based monitors, espe-
cially by KI-Mon [12]. Therefore, we assume that adversaries have already
gained administrators’ privilege on the host system and thus are able to
install rootkits to hide themselves or leave backdoors to the host system; for
instance, the attackers can install LKMs or place hooks on critical system
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calls. However, we rule out physical attacks by an insider who has direct
access to the host system and direct kernel structure manipulation attacks
proposed in [53].
In addition, we also assume that the host system uses write-back caches,
and provides CDI, that can be connected to OCD. Side-channel attacks that
exploit the information from OCD/CDI are not considered in this work.
3.4 The Baseline System
3.4.1 The Overall System Design
Figure 2 shows a high level view of the baseline system. Since our
monitoring system employs the snoop-based monitoring scheme, it is similar
to the prototype of KI-Mon[12]. To ensure the integrity of the kernel, the
monitor side core dynamically configures the hardware ASIC units, especially
the snooper, based on a security policy.
We designed our baseline monitor to support various policies on detect-
ing attacks on immutable regions and mutable objects that have invariant



















Figure 2: The overall baseline system design
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should not be modified after the boot process is complete, such as the system
call table (SCT) and interrupt descriptor table (IDT). Kernel mutable object
with a invariant value set is data object in which data can be updated by the
kernel at run-time, but the updated value is chosen among the set of possible
values that can be profiled prior to run-time; for instance, many function
pointers within kernel objects are known that each function pointer points to
one of its possible candidate landing sites [12].
According to the security policy of the host CPU, the snooper is config-
ured with appropriate address ranges of the kernel data objects or regions to
be monitored on main memory. Then the snooper constantly acquires write
events placed on the system bus, filters out every benign event that is not
relevant to the monitored regions, and transfers only the ones that violate the
current security policy to the verifier core for further investigation.
While attacks on immutable regions can be easily detected by simply
snooping the bus for write events on the region, catching evidence of mali-
cious modifications on kernel mutable objects with invariant value sets is not
straightforward since mere write events cannot be regarded as a symptom
of attacks. Therefore, we employ techniques similar to the ones proposed in
[12] such as the whitelisting-based verification and callback-based semantic
verification that basically verifies the written values as well. The detailed
explanation of these techniques are omitted in this chapter since our work is
focused on overcoming the CIH effect rather than suggesting new detection
schemes. Therefore, readers interested in these techniques are kindly referred
to [12].
The key difference between our baseline system and the prototype of
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[12] is that ours uses write-back caches. Therefore, snooping only the system
bus may cause detection failure because of the aforementioned CIH effect.
3.4.2 Periodic Cache Flush for Cache Resident Attacks
As mentioned in [11], periodically flushing caches might help reveal
more CRI on the bus when write-back caches are deployed in the system. To
show the effectiveness of the scheme, we applied it to the baseline system.
When implementing the scheme, the flush period should be decided with
great care because a reckless choice of the period may induce either non-
negligible overhead or detection failure.
For attacks that aim at immutable regions [10], the cache flush period, p,
can be selected arbitrarily because any write attempt on the regions is deemed
malicious [10], and the cacheline where the written data is located will
eventually be evicted to main memory regardless of the period p. However,
the decision of the period p for attacks that target kernel mutable objects
is far more difficult since attackers can usually figure out a way to avoid
detection by slightly modifying the original attacks.
To better explain, consider the case shown in Figure 1. Assume that the
state of the modules list changes from the state (a) to (b) on time s, and from
the state (b) to (c) on time e. In principle, the baseline monitor concludes that
an LKM is malicious when the LKM is removed from the modules list (state
change from (b) to (c)) while the corresponding memory region for the LKM
remains in memory [12]. Thus, the period of cache flush p should be shorter
than the interval d=e-s so that every event on modules list can be revealed
on the system bus before the adversary achieve her own goal. Since d in a
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primitive LKM hiding technique is sufficiently large, p of our baseline with
periodic cache flush could be long as well, so as to detect the attack with
acceptable performance overhead.
However, by slightly changing the original LKM hiding technique, it
is possible for attackers to reduce d substantially. The devised technique
requires two LKMs, one of which is the malicious LKM and the other is
an LKM that merely hides the first one. We call the latter the hider LKM
whose role is to insert a callback function to the kernel timer, and set the
timer with a period q. Then the callback function is periodically invoked to
check whether the malicious LKM, which ultimately achieves the attacker¡¯s
goal, is inserted or not, and hide the newly added one upon detection. To
insert and hide a malicious LKM, attackers first insert the hider LKM with
an arbitrary period q, and insert the malicious one sometime later. Since the
hider LKM does not hide itself and is thus added and removed legitimately,
the monitor has no way of distinguishing the hider LKM from other normal
LKMs.
Thus, to defend against such cache resident attacks, the flushing period
d should be adjusted to a very small value. Our preliminary study showed
that, in order to attain 100% detection rate, the period d need to be reduced
to 30us, resulting in increased performance overhead of up to 84%. From this
result, we claim that the detection with periodic cache flush might not only
induce huge performace overhead, but would also cause failing in detection if




As long as CRI is accurately sent via CDI to snoop-based monitors,
many security threats due to cache resident attacks would be resolved without
modifying the host internal architecture. Unfortunately, realizing precise and
efficient deliverance of these signals in an actual system comes at a cost
with some implementation challenges, as briefly stated in Section 3.1. Below
is summarized two of those that must be resolved in order to efficaciously
transfer the host internal information to snoop-based monitors through the
existing CDI.
1. CDI is originally designed to send a virtual address (VA) to the OCD
unit for each memory access while the monitor demands physical addresses
(PA) so as not to be disrupted by the certain type of attacks which will be
discussed shortly. Therefore, the original VAs from CDI cannot be directly
used for a snoop-based monitor.
2. The number of memory events coming from CDI is far larger than
that of those appearing on the system bus because a majority of write events
originating from CPU are hidden by caches on the way to the bus. This
excessive number of events sent from CDI could be burdensome to the
monitoring system in terms of performance.
These key issues are tackled respectively by two new hardware units,
the address translation unit (ATU) and the early stage filter (ESF), both
of which constitute our Extrax. Figure 3 depicts a block diagram of our
proposed system where the baseline is extended with Extrax. It is noteworthy
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Figure 3: The augmented baseline system with Extrax
memory events, the original path from the system bus remains the same. The
purpose of the path is mainly to detect attacks from other bus masters such as
DMA. In this section, we will focus our discussion on these hardware units.
3.5.1 Address Translation Unit
Upon receiving VAs from CDI, a snoop-based monitor should decide
whether the current memory access targets the regions it monitors. It seems
that such a decision can be made based on VAs, but there are cases in which
the monitor necessities PAs. For instance, consider the case depicted in
Figure 4 where the monitor is protecting a kernel data structure contained
in the critical page frame. Since this data structure is critical to the integrity
of the system and is thus managed by the kernel through the kernel page
table, no arbitrary mapping should be made to the data structure. However,
in the presence of kernel-level rootkits, it would be possible for attackers
to simply insert an LKM that generates another page table mapping for the
data structure, denoted as the malicious mapping in the figure. Thus in this
situation, if the monitor used the original VA to protect this type of kernel
structures, the attackers could indirectly modify the kernel data with the
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Figure 4: Multiple virtual addresses mapping example
newly mapped VA, hence successfully escaping the vigilance of the monitor.
To deal with the cases where PAs must be supplied for security monitors,
we have installed ATU that translates VAs from CDI into physical ones. The
overall architecture of ATU is displayed in Figure 5. ATU is configured
by the monitor through the advanced high-performance bus (AHB) slave
interface. On a translation lookaside buffer (TLB) miss, a page table walk is
initiated through the AHB master interface, which is connected to the host
system bus. The input to ATU includes a VA, the context ID and the base
address of the Linux page global directory (PGD). The former two inputs are
provided by CDI, while the latter one is configured through the AHB master
interface immediately after the current context ID is updated. TLB is a fully
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Figure 5: The structure of the ATU
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associative table in which the number of entries can be configured from 16
to 32. It has a random replacement policy.
3.5.2 Early Stage Filter
With the help of CDI, our monitor is now able to snoop every write
event generated by the host CPU without suffering from the CIH effect. This
abundant information continuously streaming into the monitor will certainly
enhance the chance to detect cache resident attacks. However, it may also
create an excessively large volume of information flow that will inevitably
impose heavy burdens on the monitor.
Though, if we remind that the monitors usually need to watch only a
subset of the memory events of the host depending on security policies, it
would be wasteful if ATU exhaustively translates all incoming addresses
for the monitor. The problem can be alleviated if we can filter out benign
events based on a security policy. As an example, for one of the policies
considered in our experiments, the monitor is interested in write attempts to
the kernel data. Therefore, any read memory events can be safely discarded
before reaching either the monitor or even ATU. The filter operations in
this case is in fact rather straightforward since memory access types are
easily discernable right after the events occur. However, we often need to
apply more aggressive filtering to the events. As briefly mentioned in Section
3.4, the kernel data of interest occupy relatively small amount of memory
compared to the whole range of main memory. Therefore, the monitor just
needs to watch the access events on this limited region. Unfortunately, it is not
always straightforward to decide whether or not an event just emitting from
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CDI falls into this region, since its address remains virtual before reaching
ATU.
Nevertheless, there is still a way to provide a solution to this decision
problem. For this, consider Figure 5 where we see that an address translation
step does not require the page offset field; in fact, this field is identical for
both VAs and PAs. Inspired by this fact, we implemented ESF which, being
placed between CDI and ATU, removes unnecessary memory events based
on page offset before the events reach ATU, thereby reducing the number of
events delivered to ATU.
Figure 6 represents the internal block diagram of ESF, which rearranges
the signals from CDI and filters out as many events as possible. The im-
plementation of output rearrangement is somewhat simple in that it merely
reorganizes and extracts signals that are needed for the monitors to detect
attacks. Among the signals introduced in Section 2.1.1, the addresses/values
of memory write instructions and context IDs are selected and rearranged for
monitors.
In the current implementation, ESF has eight 12-bit address range regis-



























Figure 6: The overall structure of the early stage filter
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page offset field of start/end addresses that need to be monitored. The register
values can be configured by the verifier core at any time. Therefore, whenever
the critical kernel regions of interest are updated, the monitor configures the
snooper and ESF simultaneously.
After the configuration, ESF compare the page offset field of a VA that
comes from CDI with the values of address range register pairs. If the address
is included in any of the monitoring regions, ESF enables the filter output
register so that the event can flow to ATU. Otherwise, ESF blocks the address,
thus obviating unnecessary operations in ATU.
As mentioned before, current ESF implementation has 8 pairs of ad-
dress range register, limiting the number of concurrent monitoring regions.
Note that the number of registers can be adjusted for the environment of
deployment. Alternatively, we can loosely set the address range register pairs,
so that each pair contains more than one monitored region. Although it would
produce unnecessary events for ATU to handle, ESF still do not miss any
access to the monitored regions.
3.6 Experimental Results
3.6.1 Prototype System
We have implemented our baseline system as close as possible to the
design proposed in [12], as an FPGA prototype where the host CPU is
the SPARC V8 processor, a 32-bit synthesizable core [54] which uses a
single-issue, in-order, 7-stage pipeline. It has separate 16kB L1 caches for
instruction and data. In addition, the host CPU also has a 256kB L2 cache
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which employs the write-back policy. The host system bus compliant with
the AMBA2 AHB/APB protocol is used to interconnect all modules in the
system, and Linux 2.6.21.1 is used as the host OS. The snoop-based monitor
system is also implemented with the same processor and the system bus. The
snooper has eight sets of address range registers which can be configured
according to the security policy of the monitor.
To evaluate our approach, we augmented the baseline system with
Extrax. Although our host processor, open-source synthesizable core [54],
provides their own CDI specification, the information comes out of CDI
is quite restricted compared to that of commercial product, such as ARM.
Therefore, we slightly extended it to support the CDI signals equivalent
to those of ARM architecture (see Table 1). Thus, both ESF and ATU are
implemented to be compatible with ARM CDI specification [55]). Since CDI
is connected to both Extrax and OCD, we designed Extrax to disable signals
to OCD when snoop-based monitoring is turned on. ESF is configured to
have 8 address range register pairs. Our ATU, compliant with SPARC V8
Reference MMU [56], has been configured to have 16 TLB entries and 16
input queue entries.
Based on the parameters for the prototype as described above, we syn-
thesized our system onto a prototyping board with a Xilinx SC5VLX330
FPGA. Table 2 provides the area of the baseline system and Extrax in terms
of lookup tables for logic (LUTs), block RAMs (BRAMs) and DSP slices
(DSP48E). It shows that Extrax incurs 12.09% overhead for LUTs as com-
pared to the baseline hardware. Even though the area overhead of our Extrax
seems non-negligible, it is noteworthy here that our baseline system, the
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Category Component LUTs BRAMs DSP48E
SPARC V8 Core with L1/L2 Cache (Host System) 6856 86 4
SPARC V8 Core with L1 Cache Only (External Monitor) 5878 15 4
Bus components (AHB Buses + AHB/APB bridges) 908 0 0
Memory Controller 57 0 0
Snooper 3318 0 1
Peripherals (TIMER, UART, and etc.) 2480 4 2
Total Baseline System 19497 105 11
Early Stage Filter (ESF) 502 0 0
Address Translator Unit (ATU) including queue 1855 0 0
Total Extrax 2357 0 0




table 2: Synthesis result of the prototype system
open-source synthesizable core based on SPARC V8 architecture [54], has
indeed very small size. Therefore, we claim that the area overhead of Extrax
might be quite acceptable if deployed on the system with commercial CPU
core such as Cortex-A9.
3.6.2 Security Evaluation
To evaluate the security monitoring capability of our approach, we chose
several well-known attack techniques that are employed in real-world rootkits
[11] and implemented four rootkits that target either immutable regions or
kernel mutable objects. Table 3 lists the rootkits, of which the specific target
can be deduced by their names. The first two target immutable regions
while the others, the LKM and virtual file system (VFS) hooking attacks
BaseWT BaseWB Ours-Extrax
IDT Hooking Detected Detected Detected
SCT Hooking Detected Detected Detected
LKM Hiding Detected Not detected Detected






table 3: Rootkit detection result
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target mutable objects that have invariant value sets. We also implemented
monitoring software that runs on our verifier core to configure the peripheral
units for monitoring, such as the snooper, ESF and ATU. The current address
range registers of ESF is configured to capture memory accesses only on
kernel mutable objects and other related data structures such as page tables
for the objects. Memory events on immutable regions can be safely filtered
out by ESF since, as mentioned before, snooping the system bus would be
enough to catch attacks on immutable regions.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of Extrax, we injected the four rootkits
into three system versions: (BaseWT) the baseline system with write-through
caches as in [12], (BaseWB) the baseline system with write-back caches
and (Ours-Extrax) our proposed system with Extrax. As seen in Table 3,
the monitor in BaseWT could immediately detect all the rootkits since the
host uses a write-through cache, thus immediately sending every write event
onto the system bus. The monitor in BaseWB, however, was unable to detect
attacks on kernel mutable objects because of the CIH effect. Ours-Extrax,
on the contrary, could detect all the attacks (whether cache resident or not),
thanks to our Extrax and CDI support.
Recent attackers tend to avoid launching attacks that are easily de-
tectable like those on immutable regions. Instead, of more importance be-
comes the detection of attacks on mutable regions [25]. We have just seen
that a snoop-based monitor deployed on the host core with a write-back
cache is easily nullified when cache resident attacks are made on mutable
objects. Therefore, we claim that Extrax can play a critical role in assisting
such monitors, thereby increasing the security level of the systems.
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3.6.3 Performance Analysis
Since CDI does not introduce any performance impact on the host, the
main factor which incurs the overhead is the traffic generated by ATU as
a result of address translation. To measure the performance overhead, we
chose seven applications from the SPEC 2006 benchmark suites [57], and
implemented two versions of the host system: the baseline and the proposed
full system with ESF turned off. The reason of turning ESF off is to strain
the system with the excessive traffic generated by CDI.
Table 4 presents this worst-case performance overhead, which is around
3.24%. The reason for this low overhead might be explained in a way that
even if there seem to be a number of memory events coming from CDI, the
number of events that really need memory translation in ATU is relatively
small because our ATU has TLB and most memory translation end up re-
trieving values from the TLB. We also conducted the same experiment, with
ESF turned on, monitoring the mutable objects related to the VFS hooking
and LKM hiding attacks. As seen in the table, there is virtually no overhead
caused by Extrax because ESF filters out most memory events that do not
access the monitored memory regions.
Since turning off ESF does not cause serious performance overhead
of 3.24%, some might think that ESF is not essential. As explained before,
however, its main goal is to reduce the amount of CRI delivered to ATU.
Reduced number of memory events would not only help ATU decrease the
number of events that need address translation (main memory access), but it
would also drastically reduces the number of TLB accesses, which in turn
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Application Baseline System Proposed Systemwith ESF turned-off
Proposed System
with ESF turned-on
h264 10.46s 10.57s 10.46s
bzip2 788.05s 813.62s 788.05s
hmmer 39.96s 39.96s 39.96s
libquantum 10.11s 10.11s 10.11s
parser 1.41s 1.41s 1.41s
omnetpp 969.1s 975.35s 969.1s
xalan 3.43s 3.46s 3.43s
table 4: Performance overhead
might possibly save hugh amount of power consumed by ATU.
As a complementary experiment, the bandwidth of Extrax is shown in
Table 5. This result is acquired by running the STREAM benchmarks [58]
on our proposed system in order to obtain the worst-case bandwidth that
can be produced by ATU, (meaning that no TLB hit occurs) meaning that
it constantly requires page table walk and generates memory traffic on the
system bus. Even in this unrealistically extreme case, the traffic placed on the
system bus by ATU is relatively small compared to that of other components
widely used and attached to the system bus of modern SoCs, indicating that
the performance impact on the host system caused by Extrax should not be a
serious concern.
Component Bandwidth
USB 2.0 HS (High-Speed) ~ 480Mb/s
H.264 Codec (Full HD, 16-bpp, 60fps) ≥ 1.85Gb/s
Camera Input Processing (Full HD, 24-bpp, 60fps ≥ 2.78Gb/s
CPU Security Extension (Running at 200MHz ~ 275Mb/s
table 5: Bandwidth comparison
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3.6.4 Power Consumption
To assess the power consumption of Extrax, we used Synopsys Design
Compiler, Mentor Graphics ModelSim, and synthesized netlists of Snooper,
ATU and ESF. Switching activity interchange format (SAIF) files were ex-
tracted from Modelsim with synthesized input test sequences that maximizes
the power consumption of each component. Then the SAIF files and netlists
were given as the input to Synopsys Design Compiler with a commercial 45
nm process library to estimate power consumption. The results are presented
in Table 6 with other commodity processors as reference machines. As shown
in the figure, Extrax consumes relatively small power as being compared
to commodity processor cores in products ranging from low- to high-end
computing devices.
3.7 Limitation and Future Work
Our monitoring system could overcome the problem of previous snoop-
based monitors by employing hardware security extension, Extrax, that
provides the external monitor with CRI. Even though our scheme has made a
progress in raising the security level that snoop-based monitors can provide,
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table 6: Power consumption analysis
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describe the limitations of our monitoring system.
Our prototype system is currently equipped with a total of 8 pairs
of configuration registers, in both Snooper and ESF, to store the start/end
addresses of monitored regions. Although we can increase the exact number
of registers for the systems that allows it, we cannot say that it is always
possible to store all the address pairs. In such a case, we can set a pair of
registers to represent a memory region that include more than one regions
that we have to watch. This allows us to monitor more than one regions
with a pair of registers, since we still do not miss any access to the memory
regions. Since this loosely set monitoring region would produce unnecessary
memory events, Monitor software should perform extra work to drop these
events. Our future work includes the investigation of trade-offs between the
number of registers, hardware size, and the performance overhead caused by
additional workload of Monitor Processor.
Our current system does not assume a type of attacks that target page
tables, such that a rootkit manipulates the page table to allocate new physical
pages, copy over the content of the physical pages that are being monitored,
and change the mapping to the new physical pages. However, we claim that
Extrax can detect them with slight modification that enables monitoring
both virtual and physical addresses simultaneously. Even though the attack
mentioned above changes the content of page table so that the virtual address
can point to the different physical address, it still uses the same virtual
address. Therefore, the augmented Extrax will be able to detect such type of
attacks.
In this work, DoS attack by attackers who are aware of the existence
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and internals of Extrax is not considered. Such DoS attacks might be possible
if attackers delicately craft their attacks to satisfy the following criteria. First,
attacks should consist of consecutive memory writes. Second, the target
addresses of the events should have the same 12-bit page-offset to that of
the address monitored by ESF in order for the events to be delivered to the
queue placed in between ESF and ATU. Third, the remaining 20-bit in each
target address is different from each other to avoid TLB hit. Since the current
Extrax is designed to drop events when the queue is full (even though, with
the current setting, the queue never became full in our experiment), attackers
might be able to conceal their trail by placing malicious write events among
the benign consecutive write events that satisfy the above criteria. However,
we claim that detection of such attack is not impossible because, as described
above, the memory access behavior of the attack is quite restricted and have
certain patterns. Therefore, Extrax could be augmented to detect this type of
patterns and notify the monitor so as to log the incident for later inspection.
Our system does not assume attacks that Bahram et. al proposed in
[53]. In their work, the attack named DKSM is introduced to show the vul-
nerability of virtual machine introspection tools. Since the attacks basically
exploit the semantic gap between the external monitor and the host system,
our monitoring system is also vulnerable to such attacks. However, such a
vulnerability is not our monitoring system‘s own weakness, but is an innate
weakness of all external monitors. One possible way to overcome the issue
is to employ in-host agent [53, 59] that can deliver useful information to
external monitors to bridge the semantic gap.
In the current work, we do not consider attacks that are performed by
38
tampering with only processor registers. Even though devising such attacks,
which leave the evidence only in registers but not in memory, caches or
system bus, might seem to be quite difficult, it is theoritically possible. The
most conceivable attack is to change the content of a special register such
as TTBR of ARM or CR3 of x86 architecture [60, 61] to modify the base
address of page global directory (PGD). If such an attack is successfully
launched, our monitor has no way to figure out the exact location of the page
tables that the processes is really using. Since ATU of Extrax rely on the
integrity of the exact location of the page tables, the attack would nullify
Extrax. Our future works include a development of a mechanism that can
safely deliver the content in registers to the outside the host.
Even though our current prototype is implemented with a rather old-
fashioned processor and old linux version, but the implementation is not
restricted to the technology or specific linux version because the purpose of
our work is to show readers the proof of concept of our system. Currently, we
are migrating this prototype system to the platform on which ARM Cortex
series is used as the host processor.
3.8 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed to reuse the CDI feature readily available
for debugging in modern CPU cores in an effort to elevate the effectiveness
of existing snoop-based monitors. We first discussed several implementa-
tion complications involved in the transfer of CDI signals for snoop-based
monitors located outside the host CPU. Then we suggested Extrax which
39
is an ASIC module plugged into CDI in order to convey the host internal
information from CDI to the external monitor. For precise and efficient mon-
itoring, the module performs the tasks of address translations and filtering
out benign memory write events. To validate our proposed design, we have
implemented a prototype on FPGA, and evaluated the security capabilities
in addition to the performance, power and area overhead. Empirical results
showed that our monitor, regardless of the type of caches, successfully detect
all our rootkit samples, which the previous monitoring systems often failed
to catch owing to CIH effect, with modest area and power overhead increase
along with virtually no host performance overhead.
40
Chapter 4




DIFT detects a variety of malicious system behaviors that intend to
compromise computer systems or leak sensitive information [22]. Generally,
DIFT sets up rules to tag (or taint) internal data of interest and keeps track
of the taintness of their tags throughout the system [31]. At run time, every
data derived from the one with tainted tag has its tag tainted. An alarm will
be triggered as soon as any of the tainted data involves in potentially illegal
activities, such as pointing inside the prohibited code or being included in a
data stream on the output channels. DIFT does not depend on static patterns
or signatures of attackers but on their dynamic behaviors at run time. So,
it is effective to defend against new attacks whose patterns are not known
yet, and to block any unsafe operations on sensitive data even if the data is
encrypted [16].
DIFT has been implemented in various forms of either software or
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hardware. Most software approaches add instrumented code into the orig-
inal application to track the propagation of tainted data [16, 22]. The key
advantage is that they can perform DIFT simply by programming their algo-
rithms. Not surprisingly, however, they show too large computing overhead
to be deployed in practice. Even after much effort [16, 17], the overhead
still remains one or two orders of magnitude higher than that of hardware
approaches [18, 19] in which extra hardware for DIFT operations is designed
and integrated into an existing processor for acceleration. The hardware typi-
cally consists of logic blocks that monitor the execution of each instruction
in the processor and keep track of tag information flowing from the execution
unit at every cycle.
Unfortunately, the remarkable speed of hardware DIFT comes at a cost.
To maximize the performance, the hardware has been tightly integrated in-
side the processor. However, such integration mandates major modifications
to processor internal components such as registers and pipeline datapaths,
thus substantially increasing the time and cost for re-manufacturing existing
processor core architecture [31]. As alternatives to mitigate this problem,
there have been more recent studies [31, 20, 21] that propose the techniques
aiming to minimize the change to the processor core internal. In their ap-
proaches, the host processor can concentrate on the execution of its own code
while the time-consuming tag propagation work for DIFT is offloaded to the
DIFT hardware device outside the processor. In the literature, they empiri-
cally demonstrated that DIFT can be carried out in a great speed by external
hardware, relieving significant burden for DIFT computation from the host.
However, there still remains a great challenge to overcome for the success
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of these approaches. The challenge originates from the limited ability of an
external device to monitor every internal state change dynamically made by
the code running on the host. For precise DIFT, the external monitor should
be able to receive from the host virtually all essential runtime information
including branch targets, memory addresses and register moves, which will
incur a tremendous amount of traffic for communication between the two de-
vices. In [21, 20], they report that the communication overhead may account
for up to 30% of the total execution time even after all their optimizations
through hardware communication buffers and special instructions. In [31],
this overhead issue was treated more aggressively by modifying the host
architecture in a way that a customized interface can be embedded into the
processor pipelines. Through this interface, their external device was able to
have a special connection for extracting any runtime information for DIFT
computation directly from the internal pipelines with very little overhead.
In this chapter, we introduce our recent work on building a hardware
DIFT engine. Our approach is similar to those in [21, 20, 31] in that our
engine is also connected externally to the host processor. But looking at the
details, ours is different from them in several aspects. One main difference is
that our approach does not modify internally the host architecture to provide
a DIFT-customized interface or connection for the external engine. In our
system, the engine is connected to the processor via CDI.
Being plugged into CDI, our DIFT engine has full access to the bountiful
information transmitted from CDI. However, as already explained in the
previous chapter, the set of CDI signals cannot be simply fed into the DIFT
engine, and they must be refined and filtered into what are suitable for DIFT
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computation. Therefore in our design, between the DIFT engine and CDI,
there lies a component, called the CDI filter, which, taking the CDI signals
as input, filters the signals properly before delivering them to the engine.
In Section 4.2, we characterize DIFT computations, and discuss how DIFT
works on our computing system with an external engine for DIFT. Then
in Section 4.3, we describe in detail the hardware structure of our DIFT
engine, and explain how the engine efficiently receives all necessary runtime
information through the CDI filter. Experimental results in Section 4.4 show
that our engine successfully operates at extremely high speed to provide
ample protection against various attacks.
4.2 DIFT Process with an External Hardware Engine
DIFT has been applied to analyze the runtime behaviors of diverse types
of attacks, such as SQL injections, buffer overflows and data leak prevention
(DLP). In this section, as an example, we explain the DIFT process to
guarantee DLP and how it works in our computing framework for DIFT
where a DIFT hardware engine is connected to the host processor.
Generally, the first step of DIFT for DLP is tag initialization where
Attacker Code for Data Leak DIFT for DLP
1. file_ptr = file_open("Password");
2. data = read (file_ptr);
3. encrypted_data = encryption (data);
4. data_leak (encrypted_data);
1. tag [file_ptr] = "sensitive"
2. tag [data] = tag [file_ptr];
3. tag [encrypted_data] = tag [data];
4. if (tag [encrypted_data] == "sensitive")
        Exception!!
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Example for DLP using DIFT
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the input data from confidential sources are tagged as sensitive. After tag
initialization, follows the tag propagation step in which any new data derived
from the tagged data is also tagged. Tag propagation continues through code
execution. When there is any attempt to extract some data toward outer world,
such as sending data over the network or saving it to a storage device, the
data is checked whether it is tagged or not. If any tagged data is detected at
the tag check step, a security exception will be raised. Figure 7 presents a
code example to illustrate the DIFT process that ensures DLP. Lines 1 and
4 correspond respectively to the tag initialization and tag check stages, and
lines 2 and 3 to the tag propagation stage. In our system, the host OS kernel
takes responsibility of the first two stages, and our engine of the last one
partially because tag propagation is the pivotal and most time-consuming task
in DIFT. To denote the tagging in its tag propagation, our engine associates a
tag bit with each data location such as registers and memory. When data is
tagged, it taints the tag bit by setting the bit on.
We now explain how the attack in the example can be detected by
DIFT whether or not the data is encrypted. First, for tag initialization, certain
files are to be labeled as sensitive sources. In Figure 7, the file Password is
assumed to be sensitive. In the left column, we see that as the first stage of
attack, the adversary code obtains the file pointer after opening the sensitive
file, and then reads sensitive data from the file. To detect this trial of attack,
the kernel compares a file name to the list of sensitive files when the file gets
open. To enable this, we have modified system calls for file accesses, such as
open, so that the kernel can be aware of every access of an application to any
file in the system. Since this step requires interaction between the host and the
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ldr     r9, [r0, #0x40]
add   r3, r9, r3
orr    r9, r9, #0xc0
sub   r2, r9, #0xf
str    r2, [r1]
tag[r9] = tag[r0] or tag[deref[r0]]





Figure 8: Example of tag propagation rules
DIFT engine, we have implemented a tag initialization function as a device
driver that basically reports to the engine the location (i.e., register number
or memory address) of the data that need to be tainted. Then the engine, in
return, taints the associated tags for the location in the report delivered from
the kernel. In Figure 7, the file is sensitive, and so the system call initiates a
procedure in which the engine taints the tag of the file pointer by setting the
tag bit on.
For tag propagation, any data read from the file is tainted to denote being
sensitive because its file pointer tag is on. Even when the data is encrypted,
it would be tainted because the outcome of an encrypt function should be
tainted if the input is tainted. A tag is propagated in a machine instruction
from a source operand to the destination operand based on a set of tag
propagation rules which are specified at the granularity of basic operations
such as arithmetic and logical operations. Figure 8 shows a segment of the
host code and its associated propagation rules with operands. In the figure,
the propagation rule at line 2 in (b) depicts that the or operation needs to
be performed on the tags of r9 and r3 before the result is propagated to the
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tag of r3. In short, two propagation rules, or and =, are applied when the
original code at line 2 is executed. From this example, we learn that for the
generation of a tag propagation rule, the DIFT engine must decode the given
instruction and identify its opcode and operands.
The tag propagation task on our engine is basically determining whether
each tag should be on or off as the host code executes. At the beginning of
the execution, the engine allocates one tag bit per CPU register and memory
word. Every time the host executes an instruction, the engine also carries out
the corresponding propagation rule like those shown in Figure 8. Since this
rule is generated from each instruction at runtime, the engine first fetches
the same instruction from the main memory that the host CPU just did, and
tries to resolve the operand values in order to locate every tag operand for its
tag operations. However, not all values can be resolved only by decoding the
instruction. For instance in Figure 8, the load instruction at line 1 uses two
operands: register and memory. For correct tag operations, the engine must
have the exact register number and memory address. While the former is
trivially found (i.e., r9) right from the instruction, the latter remains unknown
since the value of r0 is hidden inside the host CPU. In our system, therefore,
such hidden information is forced to flow from the host into the DIFT engine
in a stream of the data values which we call runtime traces.
At the last stage of attack, the data will be leaked through network.
The operations in the right column display a sequence of DIFT actions each
corresponding to a statement in the attacker code. At line 4, the data is about
to be transferred outside through an output channel. For DLP, the kernel must
check the tag of the data given to the channel. For this tag checking step, we
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installed a function into the system calls involved in data output channels,
such as network packet generation. When data is to be carried outside in a
network packet through an output channel, this kernel function checks the
data tag with the assistance of our DIFT engine. As the first step of this
check, the function makes an inquiry to the engine with the location of the
data being transferred out. Upon receiving the inquiry, the engine checks the
tag value, and notifies the host of the tag checking result. Once the kernel
receives the result, it finally checks whether the data is leaked as part of
legitimate operations (e.g., bank transactions) or not. If the tainted data is
leaked as a result of unauthorized operations, the kernel raises an alarm. Note
that deciding the legitimacy of certain operations is in fact beyond the scope
of this work as it is irrelevant to the design of our DIFT engine.
4.3 Building a DIFT Engine for CDI
In this section, we describe how our DIFT engine is implemented to
fully support the three stages of the DIFT process defined in Section 4.2.
4.3.1 Components of the DIFT Engine
The overall SoC design for our DIFT solution is presented in Figure 9
which shows the interconnections between the host CPU core and the DIFT
engine. Within our SoC platform, the engine is connected via CDI and a
generic shared interconnect to the host CPU along with other hardware
modules. It has both the master and slave interfaces so that it cannot only
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Figure 9: Overall SoC platform
transactions to access data in the modules. In addition, it can send an interrupt
to the host whenever necessary, which would help to reduce the polling
overhead incurred during communication between the host CPU and the
DIFT engine.
The primary purpose of CDI is to efficiently support the communication
for runtime traces flowing from the host to the DIFT engine. A simple way
for this without CDI is to use a generic shared interconnect used as the
system bus. Of course however, it would consume more bus cycles that
normal data transactions could otherwise use. It should also spend extra CPU
cycles in executing instructions for the delivery. In this work, to reduce these
overheads, we have devised CDI to become a special channel for runtime
traces such that a trace can be transmitted from the host into our engine
consuming neither CPU nor bus cycles.
49
As explained earlier, CDI is a CPU side interface built in various modern
processors, which helps users verify the functionality and/or analyze the
performance of their applications. It is usually connected to the OCD unit
that allows the users to watch the control paths that their target processor
has taken during code execution, and to examine the values in registers
and memory locations. Among the types of signals listed in Table 1 in
Chapter 2, the DIFT engine does not need all these signals as the runtime
traces. Thus, we implemented the CDI filter to drop useless signals before
they reach the engine. In our current implementation, the traces emitting
from the filter include the current process ID (PID), the address of memory
data accessed by a load/store and the program counter (PC) value for the
current instruction address. Another important role of the CDI filter is to infer
the existence of a branch instruction in the current host execution path. In
our implementation, we use a simple heuristic where an abrupt change of the
PC values in runtime traces is a sign of the existence. This heuristic is based
on a common observation that PC is normally incremented by the instruction
word length without (un)conditional branches. As soon as the filter discovers
such an abrupt change, it constructs a pair of addresses, the two PC values
just before and after the change, each of which stands respectively for the
branch address and the target address. These addresses are then delivered to
the engine which uses them to grasp the host execution path from outside
CPU.
The main controller in Figure 8 governs the communication between the
host and the engine as well as all transactions related to DIFT computation.
It is configured by the host to control the DIFT engine. By setting the values
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of the controller registers, the host can direct the operations of the engine,
such as initialization and assignment of the functions for the tag propagation
unit (TPU). As the central component of our engine, TPU processes all the
tags that are associated with data storage in the host. Each entry in the tag
register file (TRF) represents the tag for an individual register in the host
CPU. Borrowing the idea from [40], the engine reserves a special region,
called the tag space, in memory to stores a long array of bits each of which
represents one word of host data in memory. To reduce the memory latency
for accessing the tag space, TPU has a small cache, called the tag cache [31],
for frequently accessed memory tags.
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Figure 10: Microarchitecture of the proposed DIFT engine
Figure 10 represents the internal block diagram of our DIFT engine.
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For unerring tag propagation, it is crucial that TPU correctly fetches host
instructions from the main memory, following exactly the same execution
path taken by the host CPU. Every fetched instruction enters the security
decode block (SDB), which derives a tag propagation rule from the opcode
and operands of the instruction, as shown in Section 4.2. If the operand
is a register, TPU reads from TRF the tag register value corresponding to
the operand. If the operand is the memory address for a load or store with
register-indirect addressing (see Figure 8), TPU acquires the exact address
from runtime traces by collecting each trace from the FIFO that temporarily
holds all the traces out of the CDI filter. Then, it loads from the tag cache
the tag bit representing the memory address. If a tag cache miss is taken
place, the tag fetcher accesses the tag space allocated in memory to fill the
requested line. Once all the tags are ready, TPU performs the tag propagation
for the fetched instruction, and writes the result back to the tag bit for the
destination operand in the instruction.
The idea of making TPU follow execution trails of the host brings about
a couple of design challenges. One of them is that to follow the trails, TPU
relies on the PC values carried in runtime traces, but the values are virtual
addresses while TPU uses physical addresses to access the host memory.
To resolve the discrepancy in these address spaces, we have the address
lookup table (ALT) in TPU. An entry of ALT consists of the PID for a
process running on the host and the virtual-to-physical address mapping
information for the corresponding process. The mapping is determined by
the host OS kernel when a new page is allocated for the code section of a
process. Therefore, we have slightly modified several system calls related to
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page allocation in a way that whenever a page is allocated for a process, the
mapping information along with its associated PID can be forwarded to TPU
for ALT update. Fortunately for our design, a process usually holds only a
few entries in ALT. This is because the code section ordinarily occupies a
smaller number of pages than the data section. When a process is terminated,
its entries are removed from ALT. For this procedure, we have also altered
relevant system calls like exit().
Another challenge here is that if TPU should always fetch instructions
from memory, it could not catch up with the CPU speed certainly because
memory is slow. To tackle this, we have the instruction cache (I-cache) in
the DIFT engine. When TPU fetches an instruction, it first tries to load it
from I-cache. If a miss occurs, TPU commands the instruction fetcher to
read the entire cache line containing the instruction from the main memory.
As soon as a branch is detected, TPU orders the fetcher to stop and wait
until the branch result arrives from the host through runtime traces which
continuously carry the PC values. If the branch is taken, the fetcher will load
instructions from the address pointed by the new PC.
4.4 Experiment
To evaluate our approach, we have built a full-system FPGA prototype,
where the host processor is the SPARC V8 processor, a 32-bit synthesizable
core [62] which uses a single-issue, in-order, 7-stage pipeline. It has separate
4K-byte 2-way set associative instruction and data caches. The architecture
of our DIFT engine has been implemented as described in Section 4.3.
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Category Component LUTs BRAMs
SPARC V8 Core (Host Processor) 4876 18
Bus components 439 0
Memory Controller 405 0
Peripherals (TIMER, UART, and etc.) 963 2
Total Baseline System 6683 20
Address Lookup Table 670 0
AHB Master IF 154 0
CDI Filter 27 0
FIFO 129 0
Instruction Cache 293 10
Instruction/Tag Fetcher 97 0
Main Controller 176 0
Security Decode Block (SDB) 35 0
Tag ALU/Tag Register File 109 0
Tag Cache 180 2
Total DIFT Engine 1870 12





table 7: Synthesis result
Even though our host core provides their own CDI specification [62], the
information that comes out of CDI is quite restricted compared to that of
commercial products, such as ARM. Thus, we slightly augmented our core
to support the standard CDI signals that resemble those for the ETM of
ARM [55]. We implemented the tag cache which is a 512-byte, 2-way set-
associative cache with 4-byte cache lines, and the DIFT instruction cache
which is a 4K-byte, 2-way set-associative cache with 32-byte cache lines. The
bus compliant with AMBA2 AHB protocol [63] is used to interconnect all
the modules in our prototype system. Linux 2.6.21.1 is used as our OS kernel
and, as mentioned in the previous sections, it has been slightly modified to
provide supports for our DIFT engine.
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Based on the parameters for the prototype as described above, we
synthesized our overall SoC Design onto the prototyping board with a Xilinx
XC5VLX330 FPGA and 64MB external SDRAM. Table 7 provides the
design statistics of our hardware prototype. We quantified the resources
necessary for our DIFT engine in terms of lookup tables for logic (LUTs)
and block RAMs. The design statistics shows that, compared to the baseline
SPARC core, the DIFT engine incurs the resource overhead of 60.0% and
27.98% for BRAMs and LUTs, respectively. To complement the result, we
also measured the gate count of the DIFT engine using Synopsys Design
Compiler [64]. Synthesized with a commercial 45nm process library, our
engine increases 11.98% of overall area over the baseline system. Although
it may seem to be a large proportion, the actual gate-count of the engine is
212,051. Considering that recent computing platforms deploy more complex
processors like ARM Cortex series compared to the one [62] we used in
our experiment, we claim that the area overhead due to our security engine
is acceptable in a more realistic hardware. (The gate-count of Cortex-A9
processor with 45 nm process is about 26 M [65].)
To estimate the power consumption of the monitoring engine, we simu-
lated the engine using its synthesized netlists on Modelsim [66]. As a result
of the netlist simulation, the switching activity interchange format (SAIF) file
is generated. Using the file as an input vector, we run the power estimation
tools in Design Compiler with the 45nm process library. The power consump-




To test the security capability of our DIFT engine, we have synthesized
the malware that encrypts a sensitive file named as ”secret.txt” and passes
it through the network. Our malware, which is similar to the Dorifel [67]
malware in the wild, has the ability of evading an intrusion detection system
or signature-based DLP solution by using the AES encryption algorithm.
However, as planned, any attempt to access the file from the malware will
be detected by our modified open system call in the Linux kernel. When
being detected, the kernel invoke the tag initialization function to taint the
tag of the file pointer and to configure TPU to be ready for tag propagation.
The malware naively proceeds and encrypts the data without knowing the
existence of TPU, while our DIFT engine keeps track of the information
flow by propagating tags. When the malware tries to leak the derived data,
it invokes the send system call to transmit a message through the network.
Because the system call is also modified to call the tag checking function,
the kernel receives tags of the data from TPU as explained in Section 3, and
decides whether to allow transfer the data outside or not.
4.4.2 Performance Evaluation
In order to measure the performance of our DIFT solution, we chose
eight applications from the mibench benchmark suite [68]. The performance
of our solution is compared with those of three systems that have different
configurations. The first one, called Native, stands for a system that executes
the original code with DIFT disabled. The Software-only solution employs a
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Native Software-only Software-DIFT CDI-DIFT
dijkstra 1.000 17.785 1.909 1.028
bitcnt 1.000 9.298 1.631 1.011
rinjndael 1.000 47.193 1.799 1.018
sha 1.000 22.556 1.526 1.012
blowfish 1.000 47.147 1.873 1.015
string-search 1.000 17.102 2.247 1.012
patricia 1.000 16.269 1.740 1.016
qsort 1.000 10.503 1.905 1.015
average 1.000 23.482 1.829 1.016
table 8: Comparison table of execution time normalized to Native
software-instrumentation technique to augment the host code with instruc-
tions that perform DIFT computation on the host. CDI-DIFT refers to our
DIFT solution that has an external DIFT engine connected to the host side
CDI. In addition to these three systems, we added another configuration,
named as Software-DIFT, that makes use of an external DIFT engine for time
consuming tag propagation. The only difference compared to our solution
is that the external DIFT engine does not have a connection via CDI to the
host. Therefore, for the engine, the host must execute additional instructions
to explicitly transmit runtime traces through the system bus. For this, we
instrumented the host code with a set of instructions each of which is inserted
after every branch and load/store instruction to send the updated traces to the
DIFT engine. We used our in-house tool for code instrumentation.
In Table 11, we present the performance comparison of the four con-
figurations. In the table, the host execution time of each configuration is
normalized to that of Native. The results show that th Software-only solution
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suffers from an excessive performance overhead in that the total runtime is
on average 23 times slower than that of Native. The overhead of Software-
DIFT is less devastating than the Software-only version: it shows drastically
reduced overhead of 82.9% as being compared to that of Native. However, it
yet runs approximately 1.8 times slower than Native. The main cause of such
tremendous overhead in both the configurations is the instructions added to
the host code for delivering traces. On the other hand, CDI-DIFT substan-
tially cuts the overhead down to 1.6% over Native. This amazing achievement
is mainly due to the fact that, with the supplementary information coming out
of CDI, no code instrumentation on the host is needed for our solution. The
small amount of performance loss in CDI-DIFT is ascribed to the resource
competition between the host processor and our DIFT engine because both
are connected to the same interconnect and share the main memory.
dijkstra bitcnt rinjndael sha blowfish
string-
search patricia qsort average
Native 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Software-only 17.785 9.298 47.193 22.556 47.147 17.102 16.269 10.503 23.482
Software-DIFT 1.909 1.631 1.799 1.526 1.873 2.247 1.740 1.905 1.829








Figure 11: Graph of execution time normalized to Native
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4.5 Conclusion
This work presented a dedicated engine for DIFT. Our engine has been
implemented and connected to the host processor interface via a standard
bus interconnect so that no modifications are made to the processor internal.
Nonetheless, being located outside the host system, the engine has limited
visibility into the host internal states, which becomes a major stumbling block
for successful DIFT computations on the engine. To overcome this limitation,
we provide the engine with a separate communication channel through the
existing debugging interface, called CDI, of the host. By receiving only
the essential information filtered for DIFT out of the original CDI signals,
the engine was able to perform its tag propagation task efficiently. Our
experiments on FPGA prototype revealed that the engine successfully detects
synthetic data leakage attacks with encryption, overcoming the limit of
conventional DLP solutions. More importantly, our DIFT engine attains
overwhelmingly low overhead, that is less than 2% for a group of mibench
applications. The experiments also revealed that the area overhead of the
hardware for our DIFT engine is acceptably small even when being compared
to the normal sizes of today’s mobile processors.
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Chapter 5
Monitoring ROP/JOP Attacks using
Control-Flow Information
5.1 Introduction
Code reuse attack (CRA) is a recently introduced technique that collects
from the existing code blocks a set of small code sequences called gadgets,
and chains them to perform malicious actions. Doing so empowers an adver-
sary to perform Turing-complete computation without any attacker injected
code [69], thus successfully defeating the well-known and widely adopted
technique, generally called the W⊕X (Write XOR eXecute) protection (or
interchangably called the DEP) [28].
As the CRA threat is continuously escalating, many solutions have been
proposed [70, 23, 27, 28, 29]. These solutions have come in various forms of
either software or hardware. The clear advantage of software solutions is that
they can be easily adapted to the present machine platform. Their drawback,
however, is that they may impose tremendous computational loads upon
the host machine mainly because the original program must be augmented
with extra code that will be executed periodically to check abnormal control
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transfers on the host during runtime [70, 23]. On the other hand, hardware
solutions [27, 28, 29, 30, 1] tend to exhibit high performance by accelerating
the CRA detection process with the assistance of customized hardware logics
for this task. In specific, authors in [27, 28, 29] proposed solutions where the
hardware logics are tightly coupled with the host CPU for close monitoring
of every control transfer during code execution.
Despite their dramatic performance enhancement, the main drawback
of these approaches is that they require the redesign of the existing processor
architecture, which would stymie the direct deployment of these solutions
into commercial smart mobile devices. The reason is that such modification
to the core internal is contradictory to the common design practice for a
smart mobile device in industry today. As the central computing platform
for applications running on the device, an application processor (AP) in
the form of SoC lies in each device. To meet ever-increasing demands for
low design cost, high performance and fast time-to-market, the general
design rule of SoC is now to integrate commodity processors and supporting
IPs (intellectual properties) for specific functions together. Thus, if the AP
vendors adopt some of these hardware solutions for their products, they
will be compelled to restructure the CPU core architectures, contrary to
the general convention, thus resulting in tremendous cost for design and
verification.
To facilitate the acceptance of hardware solutions for the CRA detection
in today’s smart mobile devices, some latest approaches [30, 1] endeavor to
comply with the design rule of SoC. Their security hardware IPs are practical
solutions for CRAs in a sense that they do not require any internal modifi-
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cations to current host architectures but simply external connections with
the host processor to build an SoC. The biggest challenge of the approaches
however is that, being located outside the host processor, their hardware
IPs are usually difficult to acquire the correct control flow information of
the applications running inside the host, which is essential to monitor the
existence of CRAs. In order to tackle this challenge, they exploit the built-in
debug features to reveal the runtime information of the host to the outside of
the core. Especially, the work by Lee et al. [1] implements a CRA monitoring
hardware using the debug features supported in commercial ARM processors,
which are the de-facto standard CPUs for mobile SoCs today. To provide
the efficient and convenient debug/trace environment to software developers,
virtually all ARM processors including Cortex-A8, A9 and A15 embed the
ARM CoreSight debug architecture [32]. The CoreSight architecture pro-
vides features for continuous collection of the processor execution traces
using the hardware trace unit. Utilizing this unit, the hardware IPs proposed
in the work can obtain the real-time traces of branch outcomes produced
during code execution.
Although these approaches using the tracing hardware could achieve
high performance in CRA detection, they are facing another challenging
problem. In principle, in the debug environment using the hardware inter-
face like CoreSight, it is assumed that the debugger has the same binary
code running on the host. Thus, to reduce the quantity of traces delivered
to the debugger, the interface generally does not provide the information
which could be inferred or simply extracted from the binary code. However,
unfortunately, these omitted pieces of information such as branch types or
62
source addresses for branch instructions are indispensable for accurate CRA
monitoring. To supplement the lacking information, in previous work, they
store in the main memory region the auxiliary information, called the meta-
data, that is necessary for CRA detection, and make the hardware IPs to
read the data at runtime when the detection scheme needs to reference the
data. In spite of the negligible performance overhead, they severely suffer
from the substantial storage overhead due to the additional space for their
meta-data. According to their experiments, the size of the required storage
for meta-data can even be twice bigger than that of the original application.
Another limitation of their hardware implementations is that they are only
capable of detecting return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks, which
corrupt return addresses stored in a stack to chain gadgets. Although ROP
attacks are representative examples of CRAs, there is another breed of CRAs,
called jump-oriented programming (JOP) attacks, whose objective is to alter
the target addresses of indirect calls or jumps. To successfully defend the
system against CRAs, therefore, the CRA monitoring hardware should be
implemented with mechanisms that can detect not only ROP but also JOP
attacks.
In this chapter, we present a hardware-based CRA solution that can
simultaneously monitor both ROP and JOP attacks on the system. To under-
line the applicability of our solution to existing smart devices, this unified
ROP/JOP monitor is implemented as IPs and integrated into an ARM-based
SoC. As in previous work [1], the monitor is connected with the ARM CPU
via the CoreSight interface and system bus to keep track of the host execution
traces from outside in a timely fashion. In addition, for efficient monitoring,
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we have also made an effort to avoid substantial storage overhead due to
meta-data in the previous work. For this, we analyze the program binary with
the help of compiler analysis techniques and instrument the binary in a way
that missing essential information for CRA monitoring can be efficiently
delivered on the fly from the host CPU via the debug interface, thereby
eliminating the need to store meta-data a priori for our monitor. However, a
problem with this approach is that the two independent interfaces (i.e., the
debug interface and the system bus) through which our external monitoring
IPs receive host’s runtime information are not perfectly synchronized; that
is, when at some point in the code the CPU executes an instruction, proper
pieces of the information for that execution will be generated and eventually
transferred to our monitor through each interface, but not necessarily at the
same time. Obviously, our monitor must correctly puzzle together these in-
formation pieces asynchronously arriving from two different sources to grasp
the exact execution behaviors on the host for CRA detection. To resolve
this issue, we added a special hardware logic to synchronize the incoming
information from the two sources.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2.2 first de-
scribes some background information about the ARM architecture and how
ROP/JOP attacks can be launched on ARM, and explains the threat model
with our assumptions. After Section 5.3 presents the overall system architec-
ture for the ROP/JOP detection, Section 5.4 explains in detail how ROP/JOP
attacks are efficiently detected with help of the binary instrumentation in
our approach. Also in this section, the detailed hardware architecture of our
ROP/JOP monitoring modules will be explained. Then, Section 5.5 discusses
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the experimental setup and results. For the setup, we have used a ARM-based
Zynq FPGA board [71] and prototyped our hardware modules to build a full
SoC platform on the board. The results show that our prototype system offers
a feasible security solution for protecting ARM-based SoCs against CRAs
with high speed and low storage overhead. Finally in Section 5.6, we give
some concluding remarks.
5.2 Background and Assumptions
To better understand our approach prototyped on the ARM-based plat-
form, we will firstly provide a brief explanation on relevant aspects of the
ARM processor architecture and introduce CRA samples targeting the ARM.
After that, we will discuss the attack model we assume.
5.2.1 Background
5.2.1.1 ARM Processor Architecture
In the 32-bit ARM processor, 16 general-purpose registers (r0-r15)
are provided. One noticeable feature of ARM architectures is that all ARM
registers can be accessed directly by general instructions. Since the program
counter PC is also aliased to a general-purpose register(r15), its value can
be changed by various types of instructions including moves, arithmetics or
loads/stores if it is used as a destination register. Therefore, the control flow
of program can be modified by not only instructions of branch/jump type but
also other types of instructions.
The ARM architecture provides two types of instruction sets, 32-bit
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ARM and 16-bit/32-bit THUMB to support the systems with limited mem-
ory space. It is noticeable that many Linux libraries such as libc or
libwebcore have accepted the use of THUMB instructions [39] to im-
prove the code-density. Since attackers in general gather their gadgets from
the library code which is widely available, most CRA gadgets targeting for
ARM processors tend to contain many THUMB instructions [72]. To indicate
which instruction-set is currently used, ARM has a status bit, called the T-bit,
in current program status register (CPSR).
According to the ARM official document [73], function calls are imple-
mented by bl (branch with link) or blx (branch with link and exchange)
instructions. Both the instructions perform a branch with link operation that
changes PC (or r15) while the return address is saved to the link register LR
(aliased to r14). The blx instruction has another functionality. When bit 0
of the branch target address is set, blx sets the T-bit in CPSR to switch the
instruction mode to THUMB. On the contrary, when the bit 0 is cleared, T-bit
is also cleared to change the operating mode back to ARM. When attackers
find their gadgets in the existing code base, this unique feature of blx can
be exploited. Even when a code binary is written and compiled as 32-bit
ARM by the programmer, the attackers still can forcefully read it as 16-bit
THUMB code by setting the bit 0. Through this distorted code misuse, they
are usually able to discover from the code base a plenty of gadgets consisting
of THUMB instructions which were never meant to exist in the original code.
In the ARM architecture, any instruction that can take PC as its desti-
nation is able to be used as a return. The most common pattern of a return
is to execute a bx (branch exchange) instruction with LR. The "bx lr"
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instruction replaces PC with the saved return address in LR (r14) while the
T-bit can be also changed according to the address. Another way is to use
the ldm (load multiple) or pop instructions that take PC as the destination
operand. In this case, the return address which was pushed on the stack is
restored to PC. In case of indirect jumps, the bx instruction is executed with
the register operand storing the target address.
5.2.1.2 CRA Examples on ARM Processors
To launch an ROP attack, the adversary usually exploits software vulner-
abilities (e.g., buffer overflow, integer overflow, or use-after-free) to overwrite
a part of a data region in memory (e.g., heap, stack) which contains control
data (e.g., return address, function pointer). Recall that in ARM, by writing a
return address to PC, we can easily manipulate the target of a return to point
to an arbitrary intended location within the existing code. This means that
once vulnerability is found, the attacker may maneuver at her disposal the
control flow transfers during code execution. These pointed snippets of code
become the gadgets of a ROP attack which are linked together to construct a
malicious program. If a sufficiently large code base is given for the attacker,
the ROP attack model can be Turing-complete [74]. Capitalizing on this pow-
erful expressiveness, ROP has been tried in many machine platforms such as
SPARC [75], Atmel AVR [76], PowerPC [77] and ARM processors [78].
Even though the ROP attack model is capable of achieving Turing-
complete computation, it requires tremendous efforts for adversaries to con-
struct a complex program for an elaborated attack since they usually need to
crawl painstakingly over a large code base in search of all necessary gadgets.
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For this reason, the role of ROP is mainly confined to opening the door for
the attackers to execute the injected code for real attack. To achieve this goal,
they endeavor to build a ROP attack that invokes a system call which either
opens a new shell or changes the attributes of memory pages to execute their
injected code.
Figure 12 shows one such example of ROP attack implemented for the
ARM processor. The purpose of this example code is to invoke a system call
for a new shell with the command "/bin/sh" in Linux OS. To devise the
ROP attack, we have gathered useful gadgets from libc library of ARM
linux kernel 3.8. A part of the gadget chain is shown on the left of the figure.
In ARM, as explained, there is no dedicated return instruction and thus in
this example, pop instructions are used to conduct return operations. We
have placed the return addresses inside the stack in order to chain the gadgets
as shown in the figure. During execution, each gadget performs its primitive
operation such as add, str or mov. Then, the intended return address is
popped from the altered stack, and the control flow is transferred to the next
gadget. At the end, in the last gadget, the svc instruction invokes a system
call with the function arguments fabricated by the attacker. Then it finally
opens a new shell to initiate the attacker’s own code.
Since the ROP attack model was first introduced, a number of defense
measures have been proposed to get rid of its threats by recognizing the
behaviors of ROP code which are distinct from those of normal codes [72].
However, unfortunately, these defenses have soon been neutralized by a new
class of CRAs that are based on JOP techniques [72, 79]. The key difference
of JOP from ROP is that each gadget ends in an indirect jump operation, such
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add r0, r5, r0;
str r0, [r4, #0x28];




add r1, r1, #8;
pop {r4, pc};












Figure 12: A ROP example on ARM processors
as blx and bx in ARM processors. Thus, the original defense mechanisms
that attempt to capture the violations related to the uses of returns become
useless. In ROP, a return instruction can freely access victim’s stack to jump
to the next code snippet in a gadget chain, but in JOP, an indirect jump
has no such capability of accessing the stack. Therefore, the JOP attack
model employs a special type of gadget, called the dispatcher, to create
and manage a virtual stack from which the jump instruction in each gadget
obtains the target address for the next gadget in a chain. For example, a code
snippet adds r6,#4;ldr r5,[r6,#124];blx r5 can be used as a
dispatcher [72]. This gadget increments its virtual stack pointer register r6
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and then loads the next jump addresses from the stack. After jumping to
the next gadget with the address in r5, the actual primitive operation is
performed, and the control flow is transferred to the dispatcher again. In this
manner, the model can gain its goal even without using return instructions.
5.2.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
We use the same assumptions on CRA taken by previous studies [70, 28].
We first assume that the target mobile device is under the protection of the
W⊕X policy and the OS is trusted. Considering that the modern OSes and
processors usually cooperate to enforce the W⊕X security protection rule [6],
we believe this assumption is reasonable. Under this assumption, to circum-
vent the defense mechanism, the adversaries must gain sufficient privileges
for the first time. We assume that, other than CRAs, there are no other attack
vectors or security holes which can directly escalate adversary’s privilege.
As another assumption, adversaries might have full control over the stack or
heap to exploit common memory vulnerabilities like buffer overflows and
therefore can initiate a code-reuse attack. Also, the OS kernel and hardware
are trusted until the underlying system is compromised through CRAs. We
also assume that adversaries know all implementation details of the target
application, thus being able to locate the exact address of available gadgets.
This means that the adversary can bypass any code randomization techniques
such as ASLR [5]. Lastly, the self-modifying code is not considered in our
assumptions because it conflicts with the W⊕X security protection.
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5.3 Overall System Architecture
5.3.1 SoC Prototype Overview
Figure 13 depicts our overall SoC design. The monitoring modules for
ROP/JOP detection were designed and implemented as a subsystem, called
the CRA monitor, which is then integrated in a SoC platform with an ARM
CPU. In our platform, the host CPU is an ARM Cortex-A9 processor, which
has been installed in a large number of commercial devices these days. The
host CPU and our monitor are connected via the standard AMBA3 AXI
interconnect. To obtain the results of branch operations performed on the
host, we utilize the built-in hardware modules of the ARM CoreSight debug
architecture, which are the program trace macrocell (PTM) and the trace
port interface unit (TPIU). Being tightly coupled with the host core, the
two modules deliver the branch traces generated from the host to the CRA
monitor.
It is noteworthy that, in terms of hardware design, the goal of our















Figure 13: Overall architecture of our SoC design
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ARM-based smart computing devices. To achieve the goal, we adhere to
the design convention of the commercial SoC platforms, where off-the-shelf
ARM processors and newly designed hardware modules are integrated and
connected only through the existing communication channels, such as the
system interconnect and the debug interface. As shown in the figure, our CRA
monitor is divided into two modules: the PTM Trace Analyzer (PTA) and
the CRA detector. To reduce the amount of transferred data, TPIU basically
provides runtime traces in a highly compressed form. Thus, PTA analyzes
and decompresses the incoming information from TPIU, and delivers to the
CRA detector the refined branch traces which are necessary for the CRA
detection. Upon receiving all the traces from PTA, the detector determines
whether or not the traces exhibit any symptom of CRAs. In Section 5.4, more
details of the hardware modules will be explained.
5.3.2 CRA Detection Process
As stated in Section 5.1, our CRA monitor detects both ROP and JOP at-
tacks. To determine an attack from outside the host CPU, it must be provided
with the necessary runtime information inside the CPU. In our work, to detect
both types of attacks, we have realized in hardware the detection algorithms
based on those proposed in [80] and [27], respectively. For ROP, we copy
the return address of every call instruction in a special stack buffer called the
shadow stack and check the target address of each return instruction with the
value retrieved from the top of the shadow stack. Therefore, the necessary
information to implement the shadow stack into our system are (1) the target
address of return instructions and (2) the source address of call instructions
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to calculate the address to be returned later. Unlike ROP, JOP usually creates
a code sequence by linking gadgets together with indirect jumps or calls.
Hence, to launch JOP attacks, instead of altering return values stored in the
stack, attackers try to corrupt code pointers such as function pointers, which
will be used as the target addresses of indirect calls or jumps to point to their
gadgets. The JOP detection algorithm is on the ground of a simple invariant
ruling the normal behaviors of branches in a programming language. The
invariant rule says that, in a normal program execution, the target address
of a call instruction should point to the address of a function entry, and that
of each indirect jump should always point to an address within the same
function that the instruction belongs to. To check this legitimacy to detect
JOP attacks, the CRA monitor has to obtain the information about (1) the
target address of call instructions, (2) the target address of indirect jumps
and (3) function boundaries which contain the entry and end addresses of
functions. To summarize, the essential information to simultaneously check
the existences of ROP/JOP attacks from outside the CPU is categorized into
four classifications:
(1) Target address of indirect branches (i.e., indirect calls, indirect jumps
and returns)
(2) Source address of call instructions
(3) Function boundaries
(4) Branch type to classify the branch instructions
Recall that, to reduce the quantity of generated traces, the ARM debug
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interface generally does not provide the information which can be directly
derived from the binary code. In fact, only the target address of an indirect
branch and the direction (taken/not taken) of a direct branch can be acquired
from the traces coming through the debug interface. Gathering the target
addresses of indirect branches are quite straightforward in our solution as
the ARM debug interface is designed to provide such information. However,
the other classes of information cannot be directly acquired from the debug
interface, and therefore we have devised a special mechanism where we
instrument the original binary to supply the lacking information. For this
purpose, we built an in-house tool called the binary instrumentor that can
statically instrument the target binary (phase 1). It basically analyzes and
generates binary code in a way that all lacking pieces of the information
for CRA detection will be explicitly delivered to the CRA monitor, either
through the ARM debug interface or the system bus. When the program
binary is downloaded by the OS kernel into the local storage such as a disk
or a flash memory, the instrumentor generates the instrumented version of
the binary and stores it into the storage. More detailed explanation will be
given in Section 5.4. After the instrumented code is loaded, the CRA monitor
performs its task of constantly watching the runtime traces gathered from
both TPIU and the system bus and checking if there is any behavior possibly




As briefly discussed in Section 5.3, we propose a binary instrumentation
technique that enables us to derive from the branch traces of the host system
more information including not only the target addresses of indirect branches
but also the branch types and the source addresses of call instructions. As
the first step of the instrumentation, the binary instrumentor scans the entire
code to find all function call instructions, which are executed by either a bl
(branch with link) or a blx (branch with link and exchange) instruction in
the ARM architecture. In order to deliver the information associated with
the call instructions, we introduce a new code section called the trampoline.
Each call instruction in the original code is moved to an associated location in
the trampoline and the original instruction is replaced with an indirect jump
which targets the associated place; specifically, each direct call (bl or blx
with an immediate offset) moved to the trampoline is manipulated by the
instrumentor so that it can target the same address as the original instruction
pointing to. In addition, for each call in the trampoline, there is a unique stub
which contains a direct jump to the next address of the original call. This
stub is the target of the subsequent return instruction executed in the callee
function. In Figure 14, we present an example to explain our instrumentation
technique.
As shown in the Figure, when the address of the trampoline entry is A,
every call instruction is aligned at addresses A+8∗n, while the targets of



































Figure 14: Original vs. instrumented binary (newly added parts are written
in boldface)
total number o f calls) . Using these aligned data, the types of the executed
branch instructions can be classified by simply checking the target address
coming from TPIU. Especially for a call instruction, an indirect jump to
the trampoline can be followed either by a target address or by a direction
(taken/not taken) information. When a target address follows the indirect
jump, the branch type is considered to be an indirect call. Otherwise, it is
decoded as a direct call. Note that all the calls are pointed to by indirect jumps
as a result of the instrumentation. It means that the source address of each
call can now be obtained from TPIU because the target address of the indirect
jump pointing to A+8∗n becomes the source address of the call, allowing
our monitor to calculate the legitimate destinations of return instructions
which are necessary to maintain the shadow stack for ROP detection. Also,
to detect JOP attacks, the function boundary information is indispensable
to check if the target address of an indirect jump falls inside the function
body where the current PC resides. Thus in our instrumentation scheme,
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each function is transformed in a way that it can start with an annotation
code (store func info; in Figure 14(b)) which writes the entry address
and size of the function to the memory-mapped addresses of our hardware
modules through the system bus. The binary instrumentor can identify the
entry address and size of each function by referring to the symbol tables of
executable formats such as executable and linkable format (ELF).
5.4.2 Hardware Architectures
Figure 15 shows the hardware structure of our CRA monitor including
PTA. In our SoC prototype implementation, the output signals of TPIU are
directly routed to the on-chip ports of our CRA monitor so that we can utilize
the CoreSight modules. As the host CPU generally operates far faster than
other hardware IPs such as our CRA monitor. Therefore, to transfer the PTM
traces from the host to the monitor, we implement an asynchronous buffer,
called the branch trace FIFO, which temporarily stores the traces coming
from TPIU. When the traces are stored in the FIFO, another submodule
in PTA called the trace decoder analyzes the saved traces to obtain the
target addresses of indirect branch instructions and the direction (taken/not
taken) of the direct branches. With this information, the decoder further
extracts the branch types and source addresses of calls as mentioned in
the previous subsection. Finally, for each branch instruction, its type and
associate information (i.e., source addresses for calls and target addresses for
indirect branches) are conveyed to the CRA detector for monitoring CRAs.
Figure 16 shows the unified hardware architecture of our CRA detector
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Figure 16: Hardware architecture of the CRA detector
ROP and JOP attacks. To find the existence of CRAs, our detector relies on
the aforementioned branch information fed by PTA and the entry address
and the size of functions coming through the system bus.
Recalling that the information from different sources (i.e., TPIU and the
system bus) have no ordering restrictions, the CRA detector has to combine
and rearrange the information from the two sources to keep track of the
original program sequence of the application. In order to perform this task, the
detector has two separate First-In-First-Out (FIFO) buffers, called the PTM
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Figure 17: Information flow diagram processed by the Trace Combiner
FIFO and the MMIO FIFO, to temporarily store the information received
respectively from PTA and the bus. The output signals of the FIFOs are
given as input to the trace combiner (TC), which is in charge of combining
the information from the two FIFOs and extracting the original program
execution behaviors. We present the example of the information flow from
the two sources and how they are combined by TC in Figure 17.
As exemplified in the figure, when the application begins, the program
flow encounters the initially invoked function (i.e., main()) for the first
time. This special event is notified to TC via the MMIO FIFO so that TC
can start operation (presented in Figure 17 as F.B0). At runtime, when the
program runs into a call instruction, the instrumented code at a function
prologue is executed right after the call instruction, thus delivering the branch
information (branch type and the associated information) and the function
boundary information via the PTA and the system bus, respectively. When
any of these events arrives and is stored in either the MMIO FIFO or the PTM
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FIFO, TC reads it to take an appropriate action. If the function boundary
information is written to the MMIO FIFO, TC waits for an event to come
from the PTM FIFO. Once the PTM FIFO gets an entry, TC checks the
branch type, and if it is either a direct or an indirect call, TC combines the
pieces of information from the both FIFOs (i.e., the branch type, the function
boundary information and the source address for a direct call as shown in
Figure 17); otherwise, only the information from the PTM FIFO is selected.
The information is then delivered to the CRA detector controller (CDC)
whose mission is to make the final decision about the existence of CRAs.
After the application starts, CDC expects the information of the initially
invoked function fed by TC before anything else. Upon receiving the infor-
mation, CDC calculates the entry and end address (= entry address + size)
of the callee function and stores them into a register called FUNC BOUNDS.
Later when the branch type coming from TC is a call, CDC also obtains
the entry address and size of the callee function from TC. Especially for an
indirect call, if its target address is not matched with the incoming function
entry address, it means that the call jumped to an unknown address, which
is a typical behavior exhibited by a JOP attack. If the call instruction is
a direct one or verified to benign, CDC pushes the concatenated value of
the return address (= source address + 0x4) and FUNC BOUNDS onto the
shadow call stack, whose job is to maintain a shadow copy of the call stack
on the host. The reason why FUNC BOUNDS is saved into the stack is that its
value should be restored when the callee function returns later. At the same
time, CDC overwrites FUNC BOUNDS with the newly calculated entry and
end addresses of the callee function. When a function returns, CDC pops
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the top entry of the stack and compares the saved return address against
the target address coming from TC. If there is a mismatch, it means that
the return address in the host stack is maliciously manipulated by ROP at-
tacks, and consequently CDC issues an interrupt. Otherwise, CDC overwrites
FUNC BOUNDS again with the saved function boundaries. When an indirect
jump is made in the host, CDC will check whether or not its target address
falls between the entry and end addresses of the currently running function
by referring to FUNC BOUNDS. If the address points to outside the function
boundaries, CDC deems that this is the act of a JOP attack, and spontaneously
notifies the host of this attack by setting the interrupt signal on.
Note that the shadow call stack has a finite number of entries, 16 in this
work. Therefore, it would be overflown if the target application has more than
16 times nested function calls. To cope with this limitation, we implemented
a special stack management module called the shadow stack manager (SSM).
When the shadow call stack fills up with deeply nested calls, SSM copies the
oldest 8 entries to the pre-defined region, called the CRA region, in the main
memory through the AXI Master Interface in SSM. Also, we implemented a
register called VICTIM ENTRY which plays a role as a victim cache storage
to temporarily store the most recently evicted 8 entries. Moreover, there is an
exceptional case that the host program calls the same function recursively.
For handling this case, CDC has a counter register, which we refer to as
REC CNT, to store the number of recursive calls. When the same function is
called in a row, CDC increase the counter value by one without pushing any
value onto the stack. When the function returns and REC CNT has a non-zero




To evaluate our approach, we implemented a full SoC prototype on the
Xilinx Zynq-7000 XC7Z020 evaluation board, which is equipped with a dual-
core ARM Cortex-A9 processor, AMBA3 AXI interconnect, 1GB DDR3
SDRAM, an FPGA chip and other peripherals. We used Linaro Ubuntu Linux
version 3.8.0 as our host kernel. Also, we enabled the CoreSight modules
(i.e., PTM and TPIU) in the host processor and controlled them with the
device driver which is extended according to our purpose. Our CRA monitor
and the host CPU commonly operate at 60 MHz. Based on the above design
parameters for the prototype, we synthesized the CRA monitor onto the
FPGA chip and measured the required logic count in terms of lookup tables
for logic (LUTs) and memory elements. The synthesis result shows that our
CRA monitor occupies 10.12% (5,387/53,200) of total LUTs and 0.13%
(24/17,400) of total memory elements.
To measure the detection capability of our monitor, we implemented five
CRA instances based on the Shell-storm shellcode [81] as shown in Table 9.
Especially, A2 and A5 contain long-gadgets to bypass the signature-based
CRA solutions proposed in [28, 70], which use the small number of instruc-
tions in a gadget as the distinctive feature of CRAs. libraries (i.e., libwebcore
in Android 4.2.2, libc-2.13 in Xilinx-linux and libc-2.15 in Ubuntu) as our
code base.
With the implemented attacks, we tested the detection capability of our
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Attack No. Type Goal Advanced Skill Detection
A1 ROP Open a shell - √
A2 ROP Open a shell Long-gadget √
A3 ROP Invoke a mprotect system call - √
A4 JOP Open a shell - √
A5 JOP Open a shell Long-gadget √
table 9: The description of implemented CRAs and detection results of the
attacks
monitor. As expected, all the ROP samples (A1-A3) are detected by our CRA
monitor. Since they violate the general convention of the function invocation,
their malicious behaviors are detected by our CRA monitor even when the
attacks contain long-gadgets which is an advanced skill for circumventing
the state-of-the-art CRA detection schemes. The JOP samples (A4-A5) are
crafted by using blx (indirect call) or bx (indirect jump) instructions of
ARM ISA to link their gadgets. In these attacks, every blx instruction used
to link gadgets does not target an entry of a function. Similarly, all the target
addresses of bx instructions are always beyond the current function bounds.
Consequently, all their illegal behaviors are detected by our CRA monitor.
Based on this result, we assert that our CRA monitor can protect the target
system from any type of CRAs.
To measure the performance overhead of our CRA monitor, we chose
eight applications from the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [57]. We com-
pared the running time for the applications using two configurations. The
first one is Base which acts as the control group where the execution of the
original code runs on the host processor with the CRA monitor disabled, thus





















Figure 18: Benchmark execution time when the CRA monitor is enabled
code execution with the CRA monitor enabled. We show the performance
numbers of wCRA in Figure 18 where the execution time of each application
with wCRA is normalized to that of Base. The empirical results show the
running time overhead of 4.51%/10.68% (average/max) over Base.
Also, we compared the storage overhead due to our instrumentation
with the overhead incurred by the meta-data proposed in [1]. Even though
the meta-data has been introduced to accelerate the overall detection process,
it induces substantial storage overhead proportional to the code size of the
target application. Although our approach also requires the binary code
running on the host CPU to be instrumented with additional instructions,
we argue that the amount of additional code is rather small compared to the
previous approaches. To support this argument, we measured the amount
of memory required for the CRA detection suggested in [1] and ours, as
presented in Table 10. As seen in the figure, our approach needs slightly
more memory than the original, uninstrumented code, but requires far less
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increased code (b) (b)/(a) meta-data (c) (c)/(a)
bzip2 503,664 88,020 0.1748 797,144 1.5827
mcf 464,775 82,836 0.1782 725,992 1.5620
milc 588,408 114,564 0.1947 1,169,487 1.9875
gobmk 3,973,190 286,032 0.0720 1,856,400 0.4672
hmmer 764,042 156,472 0.2048 1,147,512 1.5019
libquantum 561,254 96,804 0.1725 863,652 1.5388
h264ref 1,000,235 143,916 0.1439 1,474,460 1.4741
astar 579,187 107,604 0.1858 885,456 1.5288
average 0.1658 1.4554
Ours [8]
Benchmark Original size (a)
table 10: Comparison of binary sizes between ours and [1]
memory (on average 16.58%) than that of the technique proposed in [1] (on
average 145.54%).
The above results clearly show the advantage of our approach over the
previous work [1] in terms of memory usage. The removal of the meta-data
also gives us another advantage that our hardware IPs no longer need to read
a large quantity of data from the main memory at runtime. Although the
experiment in [1] reported that their performance overhead is about 3% due
mainly to memory contention between the host and their monitor, which
is slightly better than ours, we have discovered that their approach relying
on massive memory accesses for meta-data inherently entails a serious flaw.
In their work, the latency to the main memory such as DDR has to be
paid for processing each branch trace coming from the debug interface.
Since it requires the reference to the meta-data, the processing capability of
the monitoring hardware is severely limited. This trend gets more obvious
when the user wants to increase the CPU frequency for the higher host
performance or decreases the DDR frequency for the less power consumption.
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ARM CLK:IP CLK 1:1 2:1 3:1 4:1 5:1
Ours o o o o o
[1] o x x x x
table 11: Frequency gap tolerance of ours and [1]
(IP CLK is for both the monitor and the DDR memory)
In these conditions, branch traces are more likely to be dropped without being
analyzed. To put forward evidence to support the hypothesis, we measured
the operable frequency gap between the host CPU and our CRA monitor.
For this experiment, we implemented the ROP monitor in [1] and checks
how slow their monitor can operate while correctly performing the CRA
detection. Then, we compared the result with that of ours in Table 11. Both
of them are configured to have the same depth of the input buffers (32 in
this experiment) to temporarily store the incoming traces from TPIU. As we
expected, ours tolerates up to the 5:1 frequency gap without overflowing the
buffer. On the other hand, the work in [1] cannot stand even the 2:1 frequency
gap. This result indicates that their solution does not function correctly for
more realistic SoC architecture models where the host CPU is much faster
than external devices like our monitor. In this sense, we believe that our
approach is more acceptable in real-world systems such as APs of modern
smartphones [82] whose frequency gaps between the host CPU and other
auxiliary IPs are typically configured up to 5:1.
5.6 Conclusion
We have discussed how our hardware solution has been integrated into
an ARM-based SoC to defend the system against ROP and JOP attacks at the
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same time. The solution incurs very low performance overhead for runtime
detection of CRAs by implementing the unified hardware IPs to efficiently
detect both types of attacks. Our solution does not require any modification
in the host ARM processor internal. Therefore, our hardware modules can
be easily integrated with a commodity ARM processor core, observing the
conventional SoC design rules so that our solution can be easily implanted to
commercial mobile SoCs. Moreover, our key contribution is that ours reduces
the storage overhead dramatically compared to the previous work. To achieve
this, we propose an instrumentation technique which enables us to make the
most use of the existing debug interface. The experiments revealed that our
current implementation successfully detects synthetic ROP/JOP attacks, and
that the storage overhead incurred by our solution is acceptably small when




This thesis presents a new security monitoring solution in which an
external hardware monitor is deployed in the system and connected to the
host processor via a standard debug interface, CDI, so that the monitor can be
fed with bountiful information generated from the host. Our solution inherits
the advantage of recently proposed hardware-based monitoring solutions in
that the computation-intensive tasks are offloaded to the specialized external
hardware engine, thus reducing the burden of the host processor introduced
by the monitoring tasks. In addition, our solution establishes a separate
communication channel between the host and the external monitor via CDI,
which provides, at real-time, the monitor with information relavant to the
control-flow and/or data-flow of the target program running on the host. This
functionality provides a key to design various security monitors that can
attain both high level of security and low performance overhead, without
necessity of changing the host system internals.
To show the validity of our solution, in this thesis, we realized three
security monitoring systems each of which addresses different types of
attacks. The first system concerns the cache resident attack that intends to
88
break the integrity of an OS kernel. Under the vigilance of our proposed
snoop-based monitor and thanks to the data-flow information transferred via
CDI, no cache resident attack can succeed in compromising the kernel. The
second system uses the control-flow information coming from CDI to detect
any suspicious activities that violate a set of rules which code-reuse attacks
(JOP/ROP) may break. With the information, our system can successfully
detect majority JOP and ROP attacks, except for the newly developed call-
oriented programing style attacks, which no known defense mechanism has
succeeded in detecting. The last system uses both control-flow and data-flow
information to monitor the trace of secret data. At runtime, every data derived
from the secret data is tainted and tracked throughout the operation, and if
any tainted data is involed in potentially illegal activities, our monitoring
system raises an alarm.
The experiment results in each section evince that, implemented and
verified on a FPGA prototyping board, the solutions can successfully catch
various attacks deployed on the system. Moreover, the performance estima-
tion with a group of benchmark applications shows that our systems do not
suffer from severe performance loss. The experiment results also reveal that
the area overhead of the hardware is acceptably small when compared to the
normal sizes of today’s mobile processors. We believe that our solution can be
applied to establish more wide range of security monitoring schemes, which
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증가하고 있다. 이러한 현상은 IoT 환경이 도래함에 따라 더욱 가속화될
것으로예상되며이에따라이러한기기들이다루게될민감한정보의양
도 크게 증가할 것으로 예상되고 있다. 이러한 정보들을 보호하기 위해
다양한관점에서디바이스의보안성을높이려는연구들이진행되어왔지
만 이들 중 극소수의 연구들만이 실제 기기들에 적용이 되었고 대부분의
연구들은 가능성만을 보이는데 그쳐왔다. 이는 제안된 보안 메커니즘이
실제로 우리가 사용하는 기기들에 빠르게 적용되기 위해서는 전체 시스
템에 미치는 성능 저하가 충분히 작아야 할 뿐만 아니라 전체 시스템의
디자인시간및비용의절감을위해감시대상이되는호스트프로세서의
구조를크게변경하지않는방법이어야하기때문이다.최근제안되는하
드웨어 기반의 보안 모니터링 시스템은 높은 보안성을 자랑하는 동시에








서와 모니터링 하드웨어가 메모리 등의 자원을 공유하는 형태로 정보를
주고 받게 되면 빈번한 정보의 교환 때문에 상당한 성능 저하가 발생하
게 된다. 이러한 문제를 해결하기 위해 우리는 이 논문에서 새로운 보안
모니터링 솔루션을 제안한다. 이 솔루션은 이전에 제안된 보안 모니터링
기법들과 마찬가지로 외부 하드웨어 기반의 모니터의 이용을 제안한다.
하지만 이에 추가적으로 이 솔루션은 호스트와 모니터링 하드웨어 간의
정보 교환을 위해 공유 메모리와 같은 시스템 자원을 이용하기보다는 최




어는 본래 디버깅 용으로 만들어진 다양한 정보를 받아 보안 모니터링에
사용할 수 있는 가능성을 갖게 된다. 본 논문의 3-5장에서는 제안된 모
니터링솔루션의유효성을체크하고디버그인터페이스로부터전달받은




즉 디버그 인터페이스를 이용해 보안 모니터링 시스템을 구현하는 경우
높은성능및보안성뿐만아니라호스트프로세서의내부를수정하지않
100
는다는장점을갖는다는것을보여줄수있었다.
키워드 : 정보보안,하드웨어기반보안모니터링,디버그인터페이스
학번 : 2011-30250
101
